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FAIR USE AND ACADEMIC EXPRESSION:
RHETORIC, REALITY, AND RESTRICTION
ON ACADEMIC FREEDOMt
Maureen Ryan tt
INTRODUCTION
At first glance, copyright policy seems an unlikely subject of con-
cern to defenders of academic freedom. After all, both doctrines are
firmly rooted in the goal of advancing knowledge. The courts, however,
have begun to express a neoclassical economic view of copyright that
has troubling implications for the academy. The conspicuous adoption
of this view in recent fair use doctrine, if applied to academic use, would
be contradictory to principles of academic freedom. Although academic
uses of academic expression-academic journal articles of scholarship
and research-have not yet been challenged directly, such uses are
highly likely to precipitate the next fair use controversy.
This article addresses the contours of copyright policy in the aca-
demic context by juxtaposing principles of academic freedom against the
implications of importing neoclassical economic principles into how we
judge the value of academic contributions to knowledge. The article ar-
gues that judging the value of scholarship and research on the basis of
market preferences will reinforce the subordination and exclusion of out-
sider perspectives in the academy. Thus, importing such a system into
the university context will chill academic freedom by undermining the
principles of unfettered inquiry and inclusion upon which the university
is premised.
Copyright bestows property rights onto the authors of creative ex-
pression as a means for advancing knowledge. These property rights are
justified by an incentive rationale-as necessary to stimulate the maxi-
mum production of creative works. The social costs related to the mo-
nopolistic protection that copyright affords to authors have prompted a
need to balance the copyright incentives against the limitation on public
access to creative works. Thus, the courts and Congress have fashioned
the fair use doctrine to avoid the rigid application of copyright restric-
t This article was the recipient of an Honorable Mention Award, Association of
American Law Schools' 1999 Scholarly Paper Competition.
tt Associate Professor, University of Wyoming College of Law. My thanks to Mark
Squillace and Eric Muller for their encouragement, and to the George Hopper Research Fund
for its generous financial support.
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tions in situations where the social costs of copyright restrictions out-
weigh the benefits.
While the courts rhetorically embrace this incentive theory, they de-
cline to substantively rely upon this rationale as a basis for deciding fair
use cases.' In recent years, with the emerging discipline of Law and
Economics, 2 neoclassical economic theory has emerged as the primary
justification for copyright3 and the courts have imported this trend into
significant fair use decisions.4 Pursuant to this theory, copyright serves to
advance worthy knowledge by creating a market for creative works that
allocates those works to their highest valued use. The social value of the
creative works is then defined by the price the works can command in
the market. This theory requires that creative expression be given broad
copyright protection to facilitate its distribution in the market. Thus,
whereas incentive theorists argue that copyright protection should extend
only as far as necessary to induce the creation of new works, the neoclas-
sical economic justification for copyright requires broad restrictions on
access to such works regardless of the impacts on creativity.
This article argues that a neoclassical economic justification for
copyright is inappropriate in the university context.5 Part I examines the
goals and application of the differing theoretical justifications for award-
1 See infra Part I.B.
2 Law and Economics primarily involves analyzing legal doctrines by translating princi-
ples and assumptions of economic analysis into principles and assumptions of law. These
presumptions and assumptions are used to explain, critique, and make predictions regarding
the law. See Linz Audain, Critical Legal Studies, Feminism, Law and Economics, and the Veil
of Intellectual Tolerance: A Tentative Case for Cross-Jurisprudential Dialogue, 20 HoFsTRA
L. REv. 1017, 1038 (1992). Law and Economics relies on a number of neoclassical
microeconomic principles and assumptions. The most basic principle underlying neoclassical
economic theory is that resources are limited and human wants are unlimited. This leads to the
second principle-we need a mechanism for allocating scarce resources with optimal effi-
ciency. Efficiency in allocating scarce resources is said to exist when the gains of the gainers
compensate the losses of the losers. The third principle asserts that the market is the best
mechanism for achieving efficiency. The basic assumption underlying neoclassical economic
theory is that groups of individuals pursue their self-interest rationally after weighing the costs
and benefits of any particular action, and that an economic market model can be used to
predict the behavior of a group of individuals in maximizing their self-interest. Based on these
assumptions and principles, Law and Economics claims that neoclassical economic theory is a
scientific method that describes what is, without importing into the equation any value judg-
ment to decide what should be. This positive/normative distinction has been the source of
much of the debate surrounding Law and Economics.
3 Major contributors to copyright scholarship are attracted to the economic justification
as a framework for deciding fair use cases. The primary exemplar is Wendy J. Gordon, Fair
Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its
Predecessors, 82 COLtJM. L. Rnv. 1600 (1982).
4 See, e.g., Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing
and drawing reasoning from several economically-oriented articles on copyright protection for
software).
5 The focus of this article is on the university context, rather than on primary and secon-
dary educational environment.
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ing property rights in creative works. Part HI discusses the possibility
that a neoclassical economic justification for copyright may soon apply
to the academic use of academic expression. Part I considers whether
academic use of academic expression is sufficiently different from other
uses of creative works to warrant special treatment in copyright doctrine.
In doing so, the article explores the differing viewpoints of the appropri-
ate mission of the university. The article also reviews the correlative
policy of academic freedom to identify both the academic values implicit
in that policy, and how the policy advances the mission of the university.
Against this background, Part IV explores how the neoclassical eco-
nomic view of copyright can impact academic freedom in particular and
the mission of the university in general. The article argues that import-
ing this view into value judgments made in the university context will
impoverish the diversity of viewpoints essential to the university's mis-
sion of advancing knowledge. In conclusion, the article suggests that the
more limited incentive justification of copyright best furthers academic
values in the university context, since a policy of inclusion and access
defines the university's mission.
I. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR COPYRIGHT: RHETORIC
VERSUS REALITY.
A. COPYRIGHT RHETORIC: AN INCENTIVE JUSTIFICATION.
Copyright rhetoric justifies applying property principles to creative
expression through an incentive rationale that is theoretically founded in
the Constitution.6 Article I of the United States Constitution gives Con-
gress the exclusive power to "promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclu-
sive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."'7 The Framers'
eighteenth century use of the word "science" referred to knowledge or
learning, rather than the study that today we call "science."'8 Thus, the
constitutional goal of copyright is to advance learning and knowledge. 9
6 See Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. Rsv. 1197,
1204 (1996).
7 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
8 See Pierre N. Leval, Essay, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use Rescued, 44 UCLA L. Rev.
1449, 1450 n.3 (1997) [hereinafter Leval, Nimmer Lecture]; Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility
and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1, 7 (1995).
9 The Statute of Anne, England's early version of copyright, stated that copyright legis-
lation was needed "for the Encouragement of Learned Men to Compose and write useful
Books." Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (Eng.). This rational remained the impetus of
the first Copyright Act enacted by Congress, which carried the title, "An Act for the encour-
agement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts and books, to the authors and
proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned." See 1 Copyright Act of 1790,
ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831).
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The copyright policy envisioned in the Constitution is rooted in
democratic values. The Framers who enacted the Copyright Clause
thought it essential to the establishment of a democratic government that
society be provided with new ideas and knowledge.' 0 They viewed sci-
entific inquiry-the search for truth without prejudice-as a prime
means by which new ideas are generated." Given the Framers' predilec-
tion for open inquiry and the high value they placed on innovation in
ideas and technology, it makes sense that the Framers' focus in enacting
the Copyright Clause was encouraging maximum production and dissem-
ination of new works.
Pursuant to its Constitutional mandate, Congress enacted the Copy-
right Act,12 which entitles authors to property rights in certain creative
works. 13 According to copyright rhetoric, these property rights are not a
matter of divine right. 14 Rather, property interests in creative expression
have a limited functional role in society. Copyright rhetoric asserts that
the purpose of copyright is to advance learning and knowledge by stimu-
lating creativity that results in the widest possible production and dissem-
ination of creative works. 15 This approach views any reward to authors
as secondary to learning and knowledge. 16 From this rhetoric emerges
the theme that justification for copyright "rests solely on a utilitarian
foundation."'17 According to this theme, copyright doctrine is animated
by the notion that copyright's support for the creation and dissemination
10 See Richard Delgado & David R. Millen, God, Galileo, and Government: Toward
Constitutional Protection for Scientific Inquiry, 53 WASH. L. Rv. 349, 355 (1978).
11 See id.
12 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101- 1008 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
13 Copyright is a matter of positive law. Generally, there is no common law property
right to creative expression. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HLv. L.
REv. 1105, 1108 (1990) [hereinafter Leval, Fair Use Standard].
14 See id.
15 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(property rights afforded by copyright "are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide
a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public
purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inven-
tors by the provision of a special reward ... ").
16 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991)
('The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but '[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts."'); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422
U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motiva-
tion must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music,
and the other arts."); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("The
copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary considera-
tion .... It is said that reward to the author or artist serves to induce release to the public of
the products of his creative genius.").
17 See Sterk, supra note 7, at 1203.
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of knowledge for the benefit the publicl8is the regime's paramount utili-
tarian purpose. 19
Pursuant to incentive theory, copyright uses the economic rewards
of the market to stimulate the production and dissemination of new
works.20 Incentive theory assumes that creative expression will likely be
squelched and constricted if authors are not afforded some copyright pro-
tection to ensure a financial return on the costs of creating and dissemi-
nating their original works.21 This assumption rests entirely on the
theory that authors will not create works and make them available to the
public unless they can prevent "free riders"22 from copying those works
and siphoning some of the value of the copied work by selling the copies
to the public at a lower cost.23 Faced with such competition, the original
author cannot sell copies of her work at a price that would enable her to
recover the costs of creating the original work.24 If she cannot recover
18 See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994) ("[C]opyright law ultimately
serves the purpose of enriching the general public through access to creative works."); Twenti-
eth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 156 (1975) ('The immediate effect of our copyright law
is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good."); Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ('The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by per-
sonal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inven-
tors in 'Science and useful Arts."').
19 See Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 14, at 1108.
20 See Kreiss, supra note 9, at 4.
21 See Sterk, supra note 7, at 1207; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Demo-
cratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L. J. 283, 285, 292 (1996). Copyright case law typically char-
acterizes copyright as ensuring authors a "fair return" on their work. See Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1984) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)) ("The rights conferred by copyright
are designed to assure contributors to the store of knowledge a fair return for their labors.");
Sony, 464 U.S. at 432; Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 156 (stating that the goal
of copyright law is to secure a fair return for the author's labor); Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219. The
case law, however, does not reflect any clear sense of what constitutes a "fair return." In
economic terms, a fair return is a return of fixed costs plus a competitive rate of return on the
investment. See DAvro R. HENDERSON, THE FORTUNE ENCYCLoPEDIA oF ECONOMICS 400
(1993). Thus, it appears return to costs should be the defining quantifier. However, copyright
creates a regime whereby an author is awarded a fair return based on the value of her work
rather than the cost-based return associated with competition. This return can amount to a
monopoly rent potentially reaching far beyond fixed costs.
22 Such competitors are called "free riders" because they use another's work, sometimes
for profit, while the author or publisher pays all the creation, production and marketing costs.
See Netanel, supra note 22, at 292 n.26.
23 See Sterk, supra note 7, at 1197; Netanel, supra note 22, at 308. Because such works
are extremely easy to copy, a competitor can copy the original work and thereby avoid many
of the creation costs incurred by the original author. The competitor can then market a com-
peting version of the work at a lower price than would be profitable for the original author.
See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAry. L.
Rnv. 483, 581 (1996).
24 See Lunney, supra note 24, at 581; Netanel, supra note 22, at 292 ('This free rider
problem.., would greatly impair author and publisher ability to recover their fixed production
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the costs of her original work, the author may forego authorship in favor
of some other line of work, thus depriving society of additional creative
works.25 Thus, this theory suggests that only those authors whose desire
to create is independent of financial return will continue to produce crea-
tive works. 26
To counteract this problem, the Copyright Act grants authors certain
exclusive rights with regard to their works.27 This copyright protection
increases the cost of, and thus decreases the incentive for, copying by
allowing an author to legally prohibit a competitor from copying an orig-
inal work.2 8 Because an author can prevent free riders from copying and
distributing an author's work without paying copyright royalties,29 copy-
right protection creates an artificial scarcity3o in the means of accessing a
costs."); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law,
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 328 (1989) (arguing that when the market value of a creative work is
reduced to the marginal cost of copying that work, the author and publisher will not be able to
recover their costs of creating the work); William W. Fisher M, Reconstructing the Fair Use
Doctrine, 101 HARv. L. Rv. 1661, 1700 (1988).
25 See Lunney, supra note 24, at 492-93, 581.
26 See Netanel, supra note 22, at 292-93.
27 A number of acts are reserved exclusively to the copyright owner by the Copyright
Act of 1976, under 17 U.S.C. § 106, subject to the limitations and exceptions found in §§ 107-
120. In its entirety, § 106 reads as follows:
§ 106. Exclusive rights in copyrighted works. Subject to sections 107 through 120,
the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize
any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or pho-
norecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to
distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in the case of literary,
musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and
other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; (5) in the case of
literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and (6) in the case
of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital
audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. 1996).
28 See Lunney, supra note 24, at 600.
29 Id. at 493-94.
30 Enforcing copyright protection is essentially an effort to mimic scarcity where there is
none. Most goods and services are resources that must be divided among a limited number of
users due to scarcity-once they are used, they are consumed. Thus, one of the purposes of
assigning a property right to such goods and services is to create a system for allocating such
scarce resources. Creative expression, however, is not a scarce resource that must necessarily
be allocated. Once created, such expression is capable of enjoyment by millions without in-
curring significant extra creation costs. Thus, creative expression is a classic example of a
"public good." An unlimited number of people can enjoy the product without the product
being consumed. This means that once a work is produced and disseminated to the public, no
one can be excluded from using the work on the basis of consumption. This also means,
however, that once a work is produced, the marginal cost of disseminating it to the public
approaches zero. See Netanel, supra note 22, at 292. Marginal cost is a per unit cost that
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creative work and gives the copyright owner a monopoly3' in the result-
ing market for such access. This monopoly right enables copyright own-
ers to charge substantially more than the costs of creation for access to
such creative works. 32 Thus, by giving authors -an enforceable property
right in their works, copyright provides authors an economic incentive to
produce creative works.
While some copyright protection may be necessary to prevent an
underproduction of creative works, the monopoly property right attend-
ant to that protection carries serious social costs. For copyright to serve
its goal of promoting learning and knowledge, the copyright induced
works must be accessible to the public. However, copyright protection
decreases access to existing copyrighted works by enabling an author to
charge a higher price for such accesses. 33
Thus, the artificial scarcity created by copyright ultimately can lead
to a deadweight social loss 34 stemming from a copyright holder's mo-
nopoly on access to existing works. 35 Those seeking access will have to
pay more for the work than they would have had to pay in a naturally
competitive market. Those members of the public who may have been
willing to purchase access to the creative work at a competitive cost may
be unwilling or unable to purchase access to the work at its monopolistic
represents the increase in cost necessary to produce one additional unit of output. See MARK
SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (1996).
31 The notion that affording an author a property right in her creative works gives that
author a monopoly in that work depends upon the assumption that no creative work can serve
as a complete substitute for another. See Sterk, supra note 7, at 1205 n. 45. If one creative
work could serve as a complete substitute for another, the market would be characterized by
competition, not by monopoly. Id.
32 See Lunney, supra note 24, at 494-95.
33 Professor Lunney stated:
As copyright provides an author with an increasing degree of market power, it in-
creases the extent to which the author can profitably raise her price above a perfectly
competitive level, and simultaneously increases both the rent the author receives for
her work and the deadweight loss associated with protection of her work.
Ld. at 557.
34 Professor Netanel stated:
Defined in terms of traditional welfare economics, deadweight loss consists of two
components: (1) the extent of the lost satisfaction experienced by each consumer
who is unable to purchase the product because of its monopolistic price; and (2) the
number of consumers who experience such loss.
Netanel, supra note 22, at 293 n.32.
35 Monopoly:
reduces aggregate economic welfare (as opposed to simply making some people
worse off and others better off by an equal amount). When the monopolist raises
prices above the competitive level in order to reap his monopoly profits, customers
buy less of the product, less is produced, and society as a whole is worse off. In
short, monopoly reduces society's income.
Henderson, supra note 22, at 400.
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price2 6 In addition, those users who do purchase the work at its higher,
monopolistic price must transfer "monies that would otherwise would
have remained in their collective pocket as consumer surplus 37 to the
author in the form of a monopoly profit or rent."38 At some point, copy-
right protection reduces the supply of new works because the number of
authors deterred from creating by the high cost of accessing source mate-
rial exceeds the number encouraged to create by the economic incentives
stemming from copyright protection. 39 Ultimately, copyright's monop-
oly protection can strangle the creative process. 40
Recognizing the social costs of copyright, an incentive justification
for copyright requires that authors be protected no more than necessary
to induce the creation of new works.41 Thus, under incentive theory, the
tension in copyright law lies in determining when "exclusive rights
should end and unrestrained public access should begin." 42 Copyright's
proper scope pursuant to incentive rhetoric is "a matter of balancing the
benefits of broader protection, in the form of increased incentive to pro-
duce such works, against its costs, in the form of lost access to such
works. '43 Copyright protection must be broad enough to provide authors
36 See Netanel, supra note 22, at 293.
37 Consumer surplus is the excess value a consumer places on a good over the price of
the good. See Seidenfeld, supra note 31, at 16. "'Surplus' refers to the resources left over
after a consumer purchases those items she considers more essential." Lunney, supra note 24,
at 574 n.338. At the same time it reduces publishers' production costs, new computer technol-
ogy will enable the copyright owner to extract all profit from a work through price discrimina-
tion based on consumer ability to pay. Such price discrimination will bring copyright owners a
maximum share of consumer surplus since they can charge each customer the full amount she
would be willing to pay for access to the work. See Netanel, supra note 22, at 293 n.31.
38 Lunney, supra note 24, at 497.
39 See Sterk, supra note 7, at 1207 n.46; Lunney, supra note 24, at 485, 495.
At some point, as copyright broadens its scope of protection, the market power such protection
creates will become excessive, enabling the author to charge such a high price for access to
copies of her work that it imposes an undue deadweight loss, and unduly limits access to, or
dissemination of, the work.
Id. at 520.40 See Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 14, at 1109-10. See also Landes & Posner,
supra note 25, at 342-43 (as the number of copyrighted works increases, the amount of mate-
rial in the public domain falls, making it more expensive for authors to acquire the raw mate-
rial necessary for creating new works).
41 See Sterk, supra note 7, at 1209; Landes & Posner, supra note 25, at 343-44.
42 Netanel, supra note 22, at 285. See also Kreiss, supra note 9, at 4 ('To function
properly, copyright law must strike a balance between the rights given to copyright authors
and the access given to copyright users.").
43 Lunney, supra note 24, at 485; see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that
should be granted to authors "involves a difficult balance between the interests of authors and
inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and
society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other
hand .... 9); H.R. Rep. No. 94-147 at 134 (1976) (discussing the incentives-access balance in
determining copyright's appropriate term); Wildlife Express Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc.,
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adequate incentives to produce and disseminate creative works, but not
so broad that an author's ability to extract monopoly rents for access
chills the production and dissemination of, and access to, creative
works.44
1. Fair Use Rhetoric.
Tailoring a system of copyright protection to the minimum neces-
sary to induce creative activity would impose onerous administrative
costs. One should not expect a perfect fit. Therefore, the courts and
Congress have created traditional limiting doctrines that, when taken at
face value, seek to address the balancing problem that copyright monop-
oly creates. One of these doctrines, the fair use doctrine, purportedly
serves as a mechanism for striking a balance between copyright's costs
and benefits. 45 The doctrine provides that some unauthorized uses of
existing copyrighted works will not constitute an infringement on the
copyright of those works. 46
Copyright rhetoric asserts that the fair use doctrine reflects a theo-
retical desire among Congress and the courts to limit copyright protec-
tion in situations where such protection will not generate incentives
sufficient to warrant the social costs associated with monopoly power
18 F.3d 502, 507 (7 Cir. 1994) (balancing the author's rights to their original expression with
the need to allow others to build freely upon the ideas conveyed by a work).
44 In Computer Associates Int'L, Inc., the court stated:
Thus, the copyright law seeks to establish a delicate equilibrium. On the one hand, it
affords protection to authors as an incentive to create, and, on the other, it must
appropriately limit the extent of that protection so as to avoid the effects of monopo-
listic stagnation. In applying the federal act to new types of cases, courts must al-
ways keep this symmetry in mind.
Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc., v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992).
45 See Sterk, supra note 7, at 1205-06; Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir.
1977) ("The doctrine offers a means of balancing the exclusive right of a copyright holder with
the public's interest in dissemination of information affecting areas of universal concern, such
as art, science, history, or industry.").
46 The fair use doctrine is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). The full text of the provi-
sion reads as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copy-
righted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by
any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship,
or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use
made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include-(l) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of copy-
righted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not
itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the
above factors.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
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(or, in fact, might be counterproductive to such incentives). 47 Thus, at
first glance, this limitation on copyright protection appears to be consis-
tent with an incentive justification for copyright. In applying the fair use
doctrine, however, the courts have found distinguishing fair uses from
unfair ones problematic. Courts and commentators frequently caution
that such difficult fair use decisions should be made in light of copy-
right's purposes and objectives.48 The problem then becomes discerning
copyright's true goals by differentiating copyright rhetoric from copy-
right reality.
B. COPYRIGHT RALrrY: A NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMIC JUSTICATION.
While the incentive theme pervades the superficial rhetoric of the
courts' fair use decisions, it does not appear to animate the courts' fair
use jurisprudence. A brief review of recent fair use cases illustrates that
the courts, despite their rhetorical flourishes, appear to be defining the
fair use doctrine exclusively in neoclassical economic terms-terms that
have their basis in a broad, rather than limited, property right.
1. Derivative Rights.
Copyright's expansion into a broad proprietary right began with the
extension of protection to derivative works based on original expression.
In the nineteenth century, an author's legally protected copyright interest
consisted only of the exclusive right to make copies of her work in its
original form.49 Thus, a secondary use of an author's expression would
interfere with the author's copyright interest only if that use would di-
rectly compete with the author's original work in its original form.50
The Copyright Act now extends an author's rights beyond competi-
tive displacement of the demand for the author's original work by
prohibiting most unauthorized derivative uses of a copyrighted work.
Derivative works are defined broadly to include "a translation, musical
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version,
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted."51
Most of these derivative uses will not displace the demand for the origi-
47 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (The fair use
doctrine "permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion,
it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.").
48 See id. See also Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 14, at 1110-11 (The four statu-
tory fair use factors direct courts to "examine the issue from every pertinent corner and to ask
in each case whether, and how powerfully, a finding of fair use would serve or disserve the
objectives of copyright.").
49 See Lunney, supra note 24, at 534.
50 See id, at 542; Netanel, supra note 24, at 301-02.
51 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1998). See also 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), (4), (5) (Supp. 1996).
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nal work in its original form, and thus are not the type of competitive
uses copyright protection was previously limited to.52 Thus, the exclu-
sive right to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work
extends the author's monopoly over not only the work in its original
form, but also over noncompeting works as well.5 3
Because copyright now protects derivative works that do not dis-
place the demand for the original, the courts now hold that unauthorized
uses can amount to infringement based on lost potential licensing reve-
nue.54 As a result, the Copyright Act enables the author to control every
valuable use of her work.55 Under an incentive rationale, affording such
rights to authors is justified only when the return on derivative works is
necessary at the outset to provide incentives for the author to create the
original work.56 This would be true only in those limited cases where:
(1) the projected returns from the original work are too small to
justify the costs of production, and (2) the projected returns from the
derivative work are so large relative to the cost of producing the deriva-
tive work that the difference will more than make up the projected deficit
on the original work alone.57
Extending derivative rights beyond such limited cases expands
copyright protection beyond the reach of the incentive rationale and into
the domain of neoclassical economic justification. Current fair use doc-
trine has thoroughly embraced this expansion. 58
52 See Lunney, supra note 24, at 628-29. Note that the user will have already have paid
the market price to obtain a copy of the work and, thus, these rights require an additional
licensing fee over and above the market price for a copy.
53 See id. at 542. For example, the creator of a cartoon is afforded the exclusive right to
create toys or other objects based on the cartoon's characters. The author of a book has the
exclusive right to prepare a movie version of the book.
54 See Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, 99 F.3d 1381, 1386-
87 (6th Cir. 1996); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994),
affg 802 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), modified, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. dismissed,
116 S.Ct. 592 (1995).
55 See id. at 545-46; see also Paul Goldstein, Copyright, 55 LAW & CoNrTrE,. PROBS. 79,
85 (1992) ("Congress has given copyright owners rights to every market in which consumers
derive value from their works.").
56 See Sterk, supra note 7, at 1215.
57 Id. at 1215-16.
58 See Lunney, supra note 24, at 533-34; see also Texaco, 60 F.3d at 922 (stating that
any copying of another's work that allows one to earn a profit weighs against a finding of fair
use); Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Int'l., Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1371-73 (2d Cir.
1993) (finding that a book about a television series infringed the copyrights in the audio-visual
works that constituted the television series); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir.
1992) (making a fine art statute using a cheap, kitschy postcard as a model constituted in-
fringement); Morgan v. MacMilan, 789 F.2d 157, 162-63 (2d Cir. 1980) (suggesting that a
book about ballet could infringe a copyright in the ballet's choreography); Basic Books, Inc. v.
Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding infringement
where the defendant was making a profit repackaging the plaintiffs copyrighted works).
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2. Fair Use Reality.
The United States Supreme Court inaugurated the judicial embrace
of a neoclassical economic justification for copyright through its very
few fair use cases interpreting Congress's 1976 codification of the fair
use doctrine.5 9 The Court inadvertently60 ventured into an economic
analysis of fair use in its first case interpreting the 1976 fair use codifica-
tion. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,61 the
Court employed the economic justification of fair use analysis to justify a
finding that private, noncommercial home videotaping was fair use. The
Sony Court stated that "every commercial use of copyrighted material is
presumptively... unfair."' 62 The Court then determined that the home
videotaping at issue was a fair use because it was noncommercial and it
thus yielded social benefits while presenting no commercial detriment to
the copyright holders. 63 The Court reasoned that "a use that has no de-
monstrable effect upon the potential market for, or the value of, the copy-
righted work need not be prohibited in order to protect the author's
incentive to create." 64 In determining that all commercial uses are pre-
sumptively unfair and by focusing on a use's harm to all potential mar-
kets, the Court laid the groundwork for a subsequent fair use
interpretation that has severely limited a traditionally expansive
doctrine.65
In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,66 the case
in which the Court most clearly revealed its incorporation of market the-
ory into the fair use arena, the Court further limited the fair use doctrine
along neoclassical economic lines. In Harper & Row, editors of The
Nation magazine excerpted and published key portions of the unpub-
lished manuscript of Gerald Ford's autobiography relating to the Nixon
pardon. Time magazine, which had secured the exclusive right to print
59 See Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me? Notes on Market Failure and the
Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA QJ 305, 305 (1993).
60 Judge Pierre Leval, a noted copyright jurist and scholar, contends that the court unnec-
essarily focused on a relationship between commercial objectives and fair use to justify finding
fair use in the case of home videotaping. See Leval, Nimmer Lecture, supra note 9, at 1455-
56.
61 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
62 I1L at 451.
63 Id at 454-55.
64 Id. at 450.
65 Pierre Leval stated:
Most undertakings in which we expect to find well-justified instances of fair use are
commercial. These include, of course, journalism, commentary, criticism, parody,
biography, and history; even the publication of scholarly analysis is often commer-
cial. If all of these are presumptively unfair, then fair use is to be found only in
sermons and classroom lectures. This would not be a very useful doctrine.
Leval, Nimmer Lecture, supra note 9, at 1456.
66 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
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prepublication excerpts from the manuscript, then refused to pay for such
rights.
In the absence of a clear mandate in existing case law as to how to
apply the statutory fair use factors, the Harper & Row Court turned to the
writings of Professor Wendy Gordon, a leading theorist for the neoclassi-
cal economic view of copyright. In an early article, Professor Gordon
had advocated that fair use be restricted to cases where the defendant
proves that market failure is insurmountable, that transferring control
over the use would serve the public interest, and that the copyright
owner's incentives would not be substantially impaired.67 Thus, accord-
ing to Professor Gordon, the narrow role of fair use is to correct market
failure or protect socially desirable uses that do not impact the value of
the copyright.
In Harper & Row, the Court relied heavily on Professor Gordon's
application of neoclassical economic analysis to fair use questions. After
invoking the obligatory incentive language,68the Court, without relying
on any precedent, characterized the effect of a challenged use on the
market for the original creative work as "undoubtedly the single most
important element of fair use."'69 Thus, impact on potential licensing
revenues immediately became determinative of fair use questions. Im-
plementing Gordon's market model of fair use, as well as the restrictive
conditions that flow from that model, the Court held that fair use should
be available only in isolated cases of market failure and in the absence of
any adverse effect on the potential market for the copyrighted work not
only from the use in question, but from others like it.70 Thus, the Court
construed copyright to give an author a property right defined by the
prerogative to extract all actual and potential economic value from a cre-
ative work not limited to that which is necessary to stimulate production.
This reasoning provided the court the justification for stating that The
Nation's use of the excerpts was not a fair use.
The Court next touched on fair use analysis in Stewart v. Abend.71
In Stewart, the Court held that a filmmaker's unauthorized use of a short
story as a basis for a derivative motion picture was not a fair use because
67 Professor Wendy Gordon presented this neoclassicist approach to fair use analysis in
Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1605 (1982) (discussing fair
use where transactions costs or other impediments interfere with free market transactions be-
tween copyright owners and users).
68 The Court explained that copyright serves "to motivate the creative activity of au-
thors ... by the provision of a special reward." Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 546 (citing
Twentieth Century Music Corp v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
69 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566.
70 See id. at 549-50.
71 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
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it impinged on the ability to market new versions of the story.72 In its
brief analysis of the fair use factors, the Court restated that the effect on
the potential market was the most important factor to consider.73
In its most recent foray into fair use analysis, Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc.,74 the Court employed market failure analysis to uphold
a parody as fair use. In this case, the music group 2 Live Crew released a
rap version of Roy Orbison's 1964 pop hit "Oh, Pretty Woman." Acuff-
Rose, a music publisher holding the copyright to the song, sued the group
for copyright infringement. The Court held that 2 Live Crew's version of
the song, even though commercial,75 was a parody of the original
Orbison composition, and hence was a fair use because it would not re-
place the original in the market. According to the Court, the market for
potential derivative uses includes only those uses that creators of original
works would in general develop or license others to develop.76 For ex-
ample, criticism would not constitute a cognizable derivative market be-
cause few, if any, copyright owners will license critical reviews of their
works. 77 Similarly, a copyright holder is unlikely to authorize a secon-
dary user to parodize an original work. Thus, parodies such as 2 Live
Crew's constitute the type of market failure that supports a finding of fair
use. The Court made clear, however, that fair use analysis must recog-
nize the copyright holder's rights to exploit cognizable markets for deriv-
ative works and that any use that occupies a derivative market within the
copyright owner's entitlements is not going to be a fair use.78
The Court's importation of neoclassical economic analysis into fair
use analysis has rendered fair use cases much less complicated than they
had been before. Instead of operating as an "equitable rule of reason," 79
lower courts can now decide fair use cases on the basis of market harm
alone. After all, the Court has declared, and lower courts have repeated,
72 Id. at 238.
73 Id.
74 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
75 In Campbell, the Court announced that commercial use should not be determinative
because "[i]f, indeed, commerciality carried presumptive force against a finding of fairness,
the presumption would swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the preamble para-
graph of § 107, including news reporting, comment, criticism, teaching, scholarship, and re-
search, since these activities 'are generally conducted for profit in this country."' Id. at 584
(no single factor should be treated as dispositive in the fair use analysis). The Court also
conspicuously failed to refer to harm to potential market as the supreme consideration in fair
use cases.
76 Id. at 592.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 590-94.
79 Committee reports described fair use as an "equitable rule of reason." See H.R. Rep.
No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976). The Sony court called fair use an equitable rule of reason that
required "a sensitive balancing of interests." Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (1984).
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that "[c]ommercial uses are presumptively unfair" 0 and that effect on
the market is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair
use.81 If a use can be construed as a commercial use having an impact on
any potential licensing revenues, that use is not going to be a fair use.
3. The Role of Copyright Pursuant to Economic Theory.
As the Court's fair use cases indicate, neoclassical economic theory,
as opposed to incentive theory, has emerged as the principal theoretical
justification for awarding expansive copyright protection for creative
works. Neoclassical economic theory does not dispute that copyright
provides an incentive for authors to create and disseminate works. Neo-
classical economic analysis provides a conceptually distinct approach to
copyright from incentive rationale. According to neoclassical economic
theory, "[t]he basic purpose of a property system, from an economic per-
spective, is to ensure that resources are allocated to their highest valued
use."'8 2 Because broad copyright protection enables the development of a
market for existing creative works, it serves as a vehicle for directing
investment in, and thus signaling the value of, such works. From the
perspective of economic theory, copyright provides the appropriate de-
gree of protection for a creative work when the market can channel that
creative work to its most "highly valued use."'8 3 Thus, while incentive
rationale for copyright focuses on the precarious balance between access
and incentive, the neoclassical economic approach strives to create and
perfect "markets for all potential uses of creative works for which there
may be willing buyers."'84
When viewed through this lens, copyright has vastly different goals.
Creative works are commodities whose value is best determined by the
market. As with other commodities, the price prospective users are will-
ing to pay for the use of a creative work reflects the value such users
attach to that commodity.8 5 Collectively, consumer demand defines the
social value of a work.86 Ultimately, the social utility and value of these
80 Sony, 464 U.S. at 451.
81 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
82 Lunney, supra note 24, at 579.
83 Ild. at 489.
84 Netanel, supra note 22, at 309. See also Wendy J. Gordon, Assertive Modesty: An
Economics of Intangibles, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2579, 2579 n.1 (1994) (stating that intellectual
property law is fundamentally "a mode of converting mental labor into a 'vendible commod-
ity"'); Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARv. J.L. & Pu.
PoL'Y 108, 118 (1990) (maintaining that "[e]xcept in the rarest case, we should treat intellec-
tual property and physical property identically in the law").
85 See Lunney, supra note 24, at 490.
86 Id. at 592 n.379.
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works is measured by the price they can command in the market.87 The
goal of copyright pursuant to a neoclassical economic justification is to
advance and allocate learning and knowledge according to this market-
assigned value.
Economic theory views a system of clearly defined property rights
as a prerequisite for market efficiency because the economic model
through which the allocative goals of copyright doctrine are theoretically
realized requires broad, fully exchangeable property rights.88 Therefore,
under a neoclassical economic justification for copyright, authors of cre-
ative expression must be afforded broad proprietary rights that extend to
every conceivable valuable use.89 Thus, while "the incentive approach
tends to look critically at copyright's expansion, questioning whether
greater protection is necessary to provide economic incentive for the pro-
duction of creative works," the neoclassic economic approach "has
pushed economic analysis in the opposite direction. It supports ex-
panded intellectual property rights and a diminished public domain." 90
The fair use doctrine detracts from a copyright owner's full property
rights. Pursuant to a neoclassical economic justification, the courts must
employ the doctrine sparingly to avoid disrupting the pricing mechanism
of the market through which customers signal what works are socially
valuable.91 Thus, the neoclassical economic theory shaping current fair
use decisions has drastically limited applications of fair use while at the
same time expanding authors' proprietary rights to creative works. 92 As
a result, the courts have converted fair use from a standard that allowed
for considerable copying as part of the process of creating a new work to
a standard that permits such a use only in anomalistic cases. 93
87 See Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy
in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 Cmawozo ARTs & Er. L.J. 1, 12 (1994).
88 See Netanel, supra note 22, at 312. Cf. Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual
Property, 18 Pare. & PuB. Asi. 31, 38 (1989) ("Markets work only after property rights have
been established and enforced, and our question is what sorts of property rights an inventor,
writer, or manager should have ... ").
89 See Netanel, supra note 22, at 286.
90 Id. at 308.
91 See id. at 307 n.97.
92 See Lunney, supra note 24, at 547-48; see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) "every [uauthorized] commercial use of copyrighted
material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the
owner of the copyright"); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922 (2d
Cir. 1994) (noting that any copying of another's work that allows one to earn a profit weighs
heavily against a finding of fair use); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F.
Supp. 1522, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding infringement where the defendant was making a
profit repackaging the plaintiff's copyrighted works).
93 See Netanel, supra note 22, at 290; see also Lunney, supra note 24, at 552:
By defining the fair use doctrine as a means to address compelling needs for access,
otherwise unaddressed, that may arise in particular cases, the Court has converted
the fair use doctrine from the primary standard by which courts are to resolve the
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On the surface, neoclassical economic analysis is powerfully allur-
ing in an area such as copyright that is characterized by the tensions of
competing interests. It provides a seemingly neutral framework for
mechanically resolving the tensions at issue in fair use cases. 94 How-
ever, in advancing neoclassical economic theory, proponents of a broad
copyright have successfully persuaded courts in fair use cases to broaden
copyright protection without considering whether such an expansion is
appropriate. 95 A rigorous systematic understanding of how a neoclassi-
cal economic justification for copyright inhibits creative authorship is
wholly absent from the courts' analysis in fair use decisions. Conse-
quently, the courts are extending copyright protection to authors without
determining whether such protection is likely to induce or inhibit creative
activity. Although the courts and Congress consistently invoke the rhe-
torical justifications for copyright in shaping fair use analysis, "copyright
doctrine now extends well beyond the contours of the instrumental
justification. '96
II. FAIR USE AND ACADEMIC EXPRESSION
Recently, in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.,97 the
Second Circuit, which is very influential in shaping copyright policy,
employed the neoclassical economic justification for copyright to hold
that photocopying of academic expression by Texaco -researchers was not
a fair use of the copyrighted works. This case comes at a propitious time
in the development of fair use doctrine because photocopying is a form
of derivative use that is receiving increasing scrutiny lately-especially
in the university context.98
issue of infringement into a secondary standard to be applied only in exceptional
cases.
94 See Netanel, supra note 22, at 311.
95 See Lunney, supra note 24, at 602 n.399.
96 Sterk, supra note 7, at 1197.
97 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994), affig 802 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), modified, 60 F.3d
913 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 592 (1995).
98 See, e.g., Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F.Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6"' Cir.
1996). In the Kinko's case, eight large New York publishers sued Kinko's for copyright in-
fringement based on Kinko's practice of copying materials selected by professors to use as
coursepacks. Kinko's sold the coursepacks to students at the same rate as any copying pro-
ject-about four cents per page. After finding that a majority of the fair use factors weighed
against Kinko's, the court held that Kinko's was not entitled to a fair use privilege and was
liable for copyright infringement. Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1547. On the first factor, the court
relied on the fact that Kinko's made a profit. See id. at 1531. Kinko's argued that the profes-
sors' use of the photocopied material served nonprofit educational purposes and that when
teaching and education are involved, the scope of the fair use doctrine must be wider. 1l at
1530-31. Kinko's argued that denying educators the fair use exception would destroy the
policy of broadly disseminating information that underlies the copyright laws. Id. at 1534. The
court reasoned that commercial concerns and educational concerns were not however, mutu-
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Copyright owners frequently complain that photocopy technology
has led to consumer copying that undermines publisher markets just as
much as infringing on the original work would. 99 Some may think, how-
ever, that fair use photocopying issues are obsolete because the current
state of computer technology bypasses the temporal and physical limita-
tions of hard copy borrowing, allowing many more people access to crea-
ally exclusive. See id. at 1532. The court suggested that if the professors had made their
photocopies at a not-for-profit shop, the copying may have been permissible. See id. at 1536
n.13. On the fourth factor, the court cited Harper & Row, in stating that the fourth factor was
"undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use." kd. at 1534 (citing Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1984)). The Kinko's court rea-
soned that the plaintiffs lost royalty income when Kinko's copied the materials without first
paying them a permission fee and that this loss weighed against fair use. See id. at 1534.
In Michigan Document Services, publishers of copyrighted works brought a copyright in-
fringement action against a commercial copying service that prepared and sold unauthorized
coursepacks to university students without paying royalties or permission fees. 99 F.3d at
1381. The Sixth Circuit began with the obligatory rhetoric, stating that "[tihe fair use doctrine,
which creates an exception to the copyright monopoly, 'permits [and requires] courts to avoid
rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity
-which that law was designed to foster."' 99 F.3d at 1385 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994)). The Sixth Circuit then held that the copying was not
fair use even though students used the coursepack for educational purposes. According to the
court, "[t]he four statutory factors may not have been created equal. In determining whether a
use is 'fair,' the Supreme Court has said that the most important factor is . . .'the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work."' 99 F.3d at 1385 (citing Harper & Row, 471
U.S. at 566). The court, relying heavily on American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., and
Harper & Row, found that because the copying resulted in a diminution of the publishers'
potential licensing revenue, the use was presumptively unfair, regardless of the fact that the
ultimate use was educational rather than commercial. 99 F.3d at 1386-87. Whereas the Tex-
aco court attempted to distinguish academic use, the Sixth Circuit circumvented the issue, but
stated, "[a]s to the proposition that it would be fair use for the students or professors to make
their own copies, the issue is by no means free from doubt." Il at 1390. Michigan Document
Services had put forth the assertions of numerous academic authors that they do not write
primarily for money and that they want their published writings to be freely copyable and
suggested that such copying will stimulate artistic creativity for tle general public good. See
ia at 1391. The court found that "[the fact that a liberal photocopying policy may be favored
by many academics who are not themselves in the publishing business has little relevance in
this connection." Id. The court quoted Judge Pierre Leval's district court opinion in Texaco:
It is not surprising that authors favor liberal photocopying; generally such authors
have a far greater interest in the wide dissemination of their work than in royalties-
all the more so when they have assigned their royalties to the publisher... .Once an
author has assigned her copyright, her approval or disapproval of photocopying is of
no further relevance.
l (quoting Texaco, 820 F. Supp. at 27).
99 See Netanel, supra note 22, at 299-300; Sterk, supra note 7, at 1201-02. During hear-
ings for the 1976 Act, a representative of a publishing group warned that if an exemption for
educational photocopying were enacted, "the end result, in the aggregate, would be the erosion
of entire markets for certain books and periodicals and in many instances to make the publish-
ing of a work simply uneconomical." Copyright Law Revision: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. On Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., I' Sess. (1973) (statement of Ambassador Kenneth B. Keating, representing Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, Inc. and MacMillan, Inc.).
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five works without purchasing them. This naive view assumes that such
technology will reduce copyright restrictions.
On the one hand, new technology does provide significant advan-
tages in terms of time and expense saved in accessing and producing a
copy of a work. Computer technology in the world of libraries has re-
suited in considerable improvement in the amount and type of informa-
tion that can be made quickly available to the library user. The
implications of electronic libraries on teaching and research in the uni-
versity context are enormous. Libraries, bulging with inexorably ex-
panding shelves of materials, may well express a preference for
publications that reside electronically in cyberspace. 1°° Readers also
might press for such a system, since it would provide even the most
remote library with all the information now found in only a handful of
metropolitan centers. For the vast majority of scholars today, unable to
travel to the world's finest libraries or to reside near them long enough to
exploit their resources, electronic access through online systems could be
a "great equalizer" in access to the scholarly resources necessary for
research and instruction. As a result of such easy access to electronic
libraries, many people will not need to have their own paper copy of
many types of works.' 01
On the other hand, accessing works via computer technology is a
form of copying, and thus presents the same fair use issues as photocopy-
ing does.'0 2 Furthermore, such technology is likely to enable new barri-
ers to access and thus exacerbate the potential inequities inherent in
restricting access. Computer technology allows a creator to control ac-
cess to works much more effectively than when photocopying provided
the main access to such works. For example, on-line access can be re-
stricted through licenses that may bar various uses.'0 3 Unlike the tradi-
100 For example, at the American Association of Law Schools' Executive Committee
Summer Retreat and Meeting held July 29 and 30, 1997, one of the highlights of the meeting
was a discussion regarding a "common enterprise" project on reducing library journal expendi-
tures. The project involves an "aggressive, cooperative use of technology to reduce the present
levels of law library expenditures for law school based journals," which could include publish-
ing some journals in electronic form only. American Association of Law Schools August 22,
1997, Report on Executive Committee Summer Retreat, 2-3.
101 See Netanel, supra note 22, at 300.
102 President Clinton's White Paper on Intellectual Property and the National Information
Infrastructure takes the position that simply viewing material on a computer screen, without
even downloading that material, constitutes copying. See INomAoN IxARsTRucrtuRE
TASK FORCE, INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASRUCTuRE,
THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 66 (Sept. 1995).
103 Such licensing restrictions could go beyond the restrictions offered by copyright law.
Whether the use of such license restrictions would or should be preempted by § 301 of the
Copyright Act is an issue beyond the scope of this article. See generally David A. Rice, Public
Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of Software License Prohibi-
tions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. Prrr. L. Ruv. 543 (1992) (discussing preemption of
contractual restrictions against disassembly of computer programs). Clinton's White Paper
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tional photocopying situation, technology provides opportunities to
extract payment for downloaded copies.
Although keenly aware of the ethical problems raised by charging
patrons for sources of information, many academic libraries will be un-
able to make such technology, and the information provided by such
technology, available to all without recourse to fees. The economics of
the situation will take their toll, and though the complex debate over the
ethical issues will, and indeed should, continue, many institutions will
require patrons to pay part or all of the costs of information. Thus, com-
puter technology is likely to exacerbate rather than alleviate fair use
dilemmas.
A. AMERicAN GEOPHYSICAL UNION, INC. V. TEXACO.
The Second Circuit's opinion in Texaco'04 extends the possibility
that the rift between copyright rhetoric and copyright reality exhibited in
fair use doctrine will soon reach the university context. Although this
case involved the use of academic expression by researchers employed in
a for-profit company, the court decided the case on a basis strikingly
applicable to traditional academic use of academic expression.
In Texaco, American Geophysical Union and eighty-two other pub-
lishers (including academic presses) of scientific and technical journals
claimed in a class action lawsuit that Texaco's practice of photocopying
articles published in the journals constituted an infringement of the pub-
lishers' copyright interest in those articles. Texaco claimed that its copy-
ing was a fair use under § 107 of the Copyright Act. 105
At the time of the class action, Texaco employed between 400 and
500 researchers to conduct scientific research impacting the petroleum
industry. To support the scientists' research activities, Texaco's library
included multiple subscriptions of many scientific and technical journals
including the Journal of Catalysis ("Catalysis"), a scholarly journal pub-
lished by Academic Press, Inc., a major publisher of scholarly jour-
nals. 106 Catalysis' editors chose the articles published in the journal
from unsolicited submissions by various academic authors. Academic
Press did not pay the authors whose work the journal published, but re-
quired the authors to transfer their individual copyright interest in the
articles to the publisher as a condition of publication. 10 7 The lawsuit
"strongly suggests that technological means of tracking transactions and licensing should lead
to reduced application and scope of the fair use doctrine." Netanel, supra note 22, at 301 n.65.
104 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994), aff'g 802 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), modified, 60 F.3d
913 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. dismissed, 116 S.Ct. 592 (1995).
105 See id. at 914-15.
106 See id. at 915.
107 See id. Each journal issue states that no part of the publication may be reproduced
without permission of the copyright owner.
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concerned the alleged infringement of such copyrights in certain individ-
ual journal articles published in Catalysis.
To keep current in his field, Chickering, one of Texaco's scientists,
viewed by the parties as representative, reviewed articles related to his
areas of research published in the various journals.'08 Texaco's library
circulated issues of relevant journals to this scientist.10 9 This scientist
photocopied eight articles from Catalysis because he felt the information
in the articles would "facilitate his current or future professional re-
search."' 10 The scientist filed the articles for later reference, rather than
using them immediately in his research."'
The Second Circuit, through a series of amended opinions, framed
the issue as whether Texaco's "institutional, systematic copying in-
creases the number of copies available to scientists while avoiding the
necessity of paying for license fees or for additional subscriptions."' " 2
The court then invoked the rhetoric that has become so familiar in fair
use decisions. Quoting Sony, the Second Circuit stated that copyright
law seeks "to motivate the creative activity of authors... by the provi-
sion of a special reward" by granting certain exclusive rights in original
works to authors. 113 The bulk of the court's analysis centered on the first
and fourth factors of the fair use statute. In determining that both factors
resulted in a finding of infringement, the court's analysis left little room
for distinguishing Texaco's copying of journal articles from the copying
of journal articles that takes place every day at universities across the
country.
In analyzing the first factor-the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes-the court determined that although Texaco did
not use the photocopied articles for a "commercial" purpose, the articles
were not used for a preferred "research" purpose either. The court first
found that while Texaco itself was a commercial entity, Texaco was not
profiting directly from the photocopying of the articles and thus "the link
between Texaco's commercial gain and its copying is somewhat attenu-
ated."' " 4 The court briefly distinguished the type of profit received
through photocopying in Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphic Corp.,
where the revenues of a photocopying business stemmed directly from
selling unauthorized photocopies of copyrighted works to university stu-
108 See ia.
109 See id.
110 See id.
111 See id.
112 See id. at 916.
113 Id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984).
114 See Texhco, 60 F.3d at 922.
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dents. 115 The court determined that the commercial/nonprofit considera-
tion asks the court to consider the value obtained by the secondary user
from the use of the copyright material rather than simply focus on the
nature of the user.116 The court refused to conclude that Texaco's copy-
ing amounted to commercial exploitation of the copied material in light
of the fact that the intermediate goal of Texaco's copying was to facili-
tate Chickering's research in the sciences, an objective that might well
serve a broader public purpose. 117 Thus, the court's Texaco analysis can-
not be distinguished in the university context on the basis of the univer-
sity's nonprofit nature.
The court then refused to view Texaco's use as a "research" use,
which is expressly listed in the preamble of the fair use statute and thus is
theoretically a preferred use for the purposes of fair use analysis."I8 The
court determined instead that Texaco's use was an "intermediate step that
might abet.., research" and thus, not a preferred research use.119 Ac-
cording to the court, after the scientist discovered the journal articles
through Texaco's circulation process, he then had them photocopied, at
least initially, for the same basic purpose that one would normally seek
to obtain the original-to have it available on his shelf for ready refer-
ence if and when he needed to look at it.120 This was not the "spontane-
ous copying of a critical page that he was reading on the way to his
lab,"12' or "spontaneous" copying that would enable the scientist, "if the
need should arise, to go into the lab with pieces of paper that (a) were not
as bulky as the entire issue or a bound volume of a year's issues, and (b)
presented no risk of damaging the original by exposure to chemicals."'122
Rather, "the predominant purpose and character of the use was to estab-
115 See id. at 921 (distinguishing Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 768
F.Supp 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
116 See Texaco, 60 F.3d at 921.
117 See id.
118 See iL at 920.
119 See id. at 920 n.7.
120 See id. at 918.
121 See id. at 919. The court stressed again, in a footnote:
the primary objective in making these single copies was to provide Chickering with
his own, additional, readily accessible copy of the original article. As the District
Court noted, '[I]f Chickering were the subscriber and sole user of the subscription to
Catalysis, and he made an extra copy of article for use in the lab or for marking with
scratch notes, the argument [for a transformative fair use] might have considerable
force.' 802 F. Supp. at 14 (emphasis supplied).
Id. at 919-20 n.6.
122 Id. at 918-19. According to the court, if the scientist had asked Texaco to buy him a
copy of the pertinent issue and "had placed it on his shelf, and one day while reading it had
noticed a chart, formula, or other material that be wanted to take right into the lab, it might be
a fair use for him to make a photocopy, and use that copy in the lab (especially if he did not
retain it and build up a mini-library of photocopied articles)." Id. at 919.
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lish a personal library of pertinent articles for Chickering,"'123 without
Texaco's having to purchase another original journal.124
In its second amended opinion, the court added the following:
We do not mean to suggest that no instance of archival copying
would be fair use, but the first factor tilts against Texaco in this case
because the making of copies to be placed on the shelf in Chickering's
office is part of a systematic process of encouraging employee research-
ers to copy articles so as to multiply available copies while avoiding
payment' 25
Texaco's copying practices and purposes appear almost identical to
the copying done in most universities to bring scholars meaningful ac-
cess to academic expression. Thus, the court's Texaco analysis cannot
be distinguished on the basis of notion that the copying done in the uni-
versity context involves a preferred research or scholarship use.
In discussing the fourth factor-the effect of the use upon the poten-
tial market for or value of the copyrighted work-the court distinguished
the "traditional market for, and hence a clearly defined value of, journal
issues and volumes" from that of individual journal articles for which
"there is neither a traditional market for, nor a clearly defined value
123 See id at 926.
124 See id. at 919.
125 Id at 920. Texaco argued that "photocopying the article separated it from a bulky
journal, made it more amenable to markings, and provided a document that could be readily
replaced if damaged in a laboratory, all of which 'transformed' the original article into a form
that better served Chickering's research needs." Id. The court made a blanket judgment, how-
ever, that if the use is an untransformed duplication:
the value generated by the secondary use is little or nothing more than the value
generated that inheres in the original. Rather than making some contribution of new
intellectual value and thereby fostering the advancement of the arts and sciences, an
untransformed copy is likely to be used simply for the same intrinsic purpose as the
original, thereby providing limited justification for a finding of fair use.
Id at 923. The court cited Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1324 (2d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 883 (1989) (explaining that a use merely for the same "intrinsic purpose" as
original "moves the balance of the calibration on the first factor against" secondary user and
"seriously weakens a claimed fair use"). The court also cited Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d
1171, 1175 (9"' Cir. 1983) (emphasizing that a "finding that the alleged infringers copied the
material to use it for the same intrinsic purpose for which the copyright owner intended it to be
used is strong indicia of no fair use.") The court barely nodded toward the benefits of the
photocopying stating, "we should not overlook the significant independent value that can stem
from conversion of original journal articles into a format different from their normal appear-
ance." Texaco, 60 F.3d at 923. The court acknowledged that Texaco's copying transformed
the articles into a more serviceable format and noted that, prior to the advent of photocopying,
the scientist might have done such transformation by taking handwritten notes. See id at 923.
Then the court made clear in a footnote that it was not implying that handwritten notes would
necessarily have been a fair use of the material "[d]espite the 1973 dictum in Williams &
Wilkins asserting that 'it is almost unanimously accepted that a scholar can make a handwritten
copy of an entire copyrighted article for his own use."' IL at 924 n.10 (referring to William &
Wilkins v. U.S., 487 F.2d 1345, 1350 (CL Cl. 1973)).
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of."'1 26 The court then characterized how journal articles are marketed to
consumers. According to the court, the publishers have traditionally
sought to exploit their monopolistic privileges only by compiling the in-
dividual articles into journal format and selling subscriptions to the jour-
nals.127 There has been no traditional market for selling individual
articles. 128 Thus, according to the court, the effect of the photocopying
on the traditional subscription market is of "somewhat limited signifi-
cance in determining and evaluating the effect of Texaco's photocopying
upon the potential market for or value of' the individual articles."'1 29
The court chose to focus instead on the potential market for a licens-
ing arrangement for photocopying individual articles and on how Tex-
aco's photocopying could affect the value of the publishers' copyrights
in such a market. 130 The Second Circuit approved the district court's
finding that "if Texaco's unauthorized photocopying was not permitted
as fair use, the publishers' revenues would increase significantly" be-
cause Texaco would have to use some method to pay for the right to
photocopy the articles. 131 Texaco had faulted this reasoning, arguing
that the very question at issue was whether the publishers had a right to
demand such a fee and thus it was inappropriate to assume at the outset
that the publishers were entitled to the right in order to assume value of,
and effect on, the right. 132 The Second Circuit answered Texaco's argu-
ment with a conclusory statement: "[i]t is undisputable that, as a general
matter, a copyright holder is entitled to demand a royalty for licensing
others to use its copyrighted work. . .and that the impact of potential
licensing revenues is a proper subject for consideration in assessing the
fourth factor."'133
The court then determined that while the publishers had not devel-
oped a conventional market for copies for individual articles, they had
created a workable market through the Copyright Clearance Center
126 See Texaco, 60 F.3d at 927 (emphasis added).
127 See id.
128 See id.
129 See id. at 927-28. Ultimately, the court determined that "the loss of a few journal
subscriptions tips the fourth factor only slightly toward the publishers because evidence of
such loss is weak evidence that the copied articles themselves have lost any value." Id. at 929.
The court noted further that, without photocopying, Texaco would not increase its subscrip-
tions enormously; Texaco would possibly increase its subscriptions "somewhat." See id. at
928.
130 See id. at 927-28.
131 See id. at 929.
132 See id.
133 See id. (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994); Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548-9 (1985); Twin Peaks Prods.,
Inc. v. Publications Intl., Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1377 (2d Cir. 1993); DC comics, Inc. v. Reel
Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982); United Telephone Co. of Missouri v. Johnson
Publishing Co., Inc., 855 F.2d 604, 610 (8th Cir. 1988)).
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("CCC")'3 for obtaining photocopy licenses that authorize users to pay
for the right to make their own copies of individual articles. 135 Because
this system exists, according to the court, it is appropriate to consider the
effect of Texaco's photocopying on this licensing market. 136
Recognizing that "the publishers' revenues would grow signifi-
cantly"'137 if Texaco obtained permission to copy through the CCC, the
Second Circuit determined that the publishers had shown "'substantial
harm to the value of their copyrights' as a consequence of Texaco's
copying."'138 The court summed up by stating:
[i]f Texaco wants to continue the precise copying we hold not to be
a fair use, it can either use the licensing schemes now existing or some
variant of them, or, if all fails, purchase one more subscription for each
of its researchers who wish to keep issues of Catalysis on the office
shelf.139
Photocopying done in the university context will have exactly the
same effect on potential licensing income as that described in Texaco.
Thus, the court's Texaco analysis cannot be distinguished in the univer-
sity context on the basis of impacts on a potential licensing market.
B. ACADEMIC USE AS FAIR USE.
The Texaco court's analysis, in refusing to find Texaco's copying of
academic expression a fair use, casts legitimate doubt on whether a court
would find similar copying of academic expression by professors and
researchers on university campuses a fair use. Although the Second Cir-
cuit attempted in its amended opinion to reassure the academic commu-
nity through lip service purportedly distinguishing what the court
characterized as systematic copying by Texaco scientists from a situation
where a "professor or an independent scientist engaged in copying and
creating files for independent research," 140 the court's analysis in Texaco
actually leaves little room for distinguishing copying of academic schol-
arship and research in a university context.
134 The CCC is a central clearing-house established in 1977 primarily by publishers to
license photocopying. The CCC offers a variety of licensing schemes; fees can be paid on a
per copy basis or through blanket license arrangements.
135 See Texaco, 60 F.3d at 930.
136 See id.
137 See id. at 926 (quoting the federal district court's opinion in American Geophysical
Union, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 19 (1992)).
138 See Texaco, 60 F.3d at 926.
139 See id. at 932. On May 15, 1995, after Texaco filed a petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court, the parties announced a settlement in which Texaco agreed to pay a large
dollar award and a retroactive licensing fee to the CCC. See Settlement Reached in Photo-
copying Suit, N.Y.L.J., May 16, 1995, at 4.
140 See Texaco, 60 F.3d at 916.
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Prior to Texaco, commentators assumed that an intermediate copy
of an academic journal article made to aid in the production of a final
work was a preferred research use under fair use analysis. 141 Thus, they
asserted that it was a fair use for an author/scholar to make copies of
journal articles as part of scholarship and research activities. 142 Further-
more, they assumed that because such copies were not created in a com-
mercial setting, they would not be viewed as causing any cognizable
market impact on the value of the copyrights. Thus, copies of such arti-
cles for access purposes would be presumptively fair use. However, by
interpreting research use incredibly narrowly, 143 and by looking to all
potential licensing markets to find market impact despite the fact that the
user is determined to be noncommercial, Texaco shoots down both of
these bases upon which a court could support a finding of fair use in the
university context.
The courts' incentive rhetoric, coupled with the Copyright Act's
supposed preference for "teaching, scholarship, and research" as fair
uses, may have lulled academia into a false sense of fair use security. A
close examination of Texaco indicates that academic use of academic
expression is far from the assumed safe harbor. Instead of limiting the
impact of copyright restrictions upon scholarship and research, the court
has significantly enlarged the scope of such restrictions to possibly swal-
low these preferred academic uses listed in the preamble paragraph of
§ 107 of the Copyright Act. In fact, it is difficult to see how the court's
Texaco analysis leaves any room for the supposed preferences listed in
the statute. The court's decision in Texaco may serve a useful purpose in
shaking academia from its complacency. Unless a critical distinction can
be made regarding academic use of academic scholarship and research in
the university setting, we must prepare ourselves for the possibility that
141 See, e.g., Kreiss, supra note 9, at 60 n.221.
142 See, e.g., John T. Soma et al., Software Interoperability and Reverse Engineering, 20
RuTGERS CoMPurER & TEcH. LJ. 189, 210 (1994); Michael G. Anderson and Paul F. Brown,
The Economics Behind Copyright Fair Use: A Principled and Predictable Body of Law, 24
Loy. U. Cm. L. J. 143, 168 (1993) ("Had the course packets not contained excepts from
textbooks but rather excerpts from a law review [article] .... a court could find fair use since
the professor's secondary use of the article would not serve as a market substitute for the
original work.").
143 In finding the work non-transformative, the court was incredibly insensitive to the
research process. Although beyond the scope of this article, the insights of current literary
thought, in which the reader "transforms" text simply by reading it, could provide the court a
more sensitive framework in which to determine the transformative nature of a secondary use.
See generally Robert H. Rotstein, Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction
of the Work, 68 Cm.-KErr L. REv. 725 (1993) (discussing contemporary literary criticism in
the context of copyright analysis).
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copyright restrictions on such academic expression may invade
academia. 144
C. COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS ON ACADEMIC ExPRFsSON:
RHETORIC OR REALITY?
To identify the ramifications of copyright policy in the university
context, we must examine whether the application of broad copyright
restrictions to academic use of academic expression reflects an incentive
justification or a neoclassical economic justification for copyright. Re-
call that the incentive justification for copyright protection bestows upon
authors limited property rights in their creative expression for the pur-
pose of encouraging authors to create and disseminate information and
knowledge. Theoretically, an incentive justification would mandate that
copyright protection be limited to cases where extending this right to
authors would induce an author to produce an original work that the au-
thor would not otherwise produce. Rarely would this be the case with
respect to academic expression.
The Texaco court itself acknowledged that academics do not create
academic expression in reliance on a market return from that expres-
sion.145 While publication of academic expression is a critical part of the
profession by which a scholar makes a monetary living, and may lead to
an increased salary often linked with promotion and tenure, this financial
incentive is not tied to the market return on a journal article. 146 Thus, the
144 Some may surmise that the publishers of an academic journal would never or could
never enforce their copyrights. Copyright owners in many arenas have become vigilant in
preventing piracy when royalties are at stake, however. They have often formed associations
to assist them. These include American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers ("AS-
CAP"), Broadcast Music Incorporated ("BMI") and the CCC. Computer companies have em-
ulated these other copyright owners by creating the Software Publishers Association and the
Business Software Alliance to help prevent unauthorized copyright of software.
145 See Texaco, 60 F.3d at 927. According to the court:
[i]n the distinctive realm of academic and scientific articles, however, the only form
of royalty paid by a publisher is often just the reward of being published, publication
being a key to professional advancement and prestige for the author, see Weissmann,
868 F.2d at 1324 (noting that 'in an academic setting, profit is ill-measured in dol-
lars. Instead, what is valuable is recognition because it so often influences profes-
sional advancement and academic tenure.') .... Ultimately, the monopoly privileges
conferred by copyright protection and the potential financial rewards therefrom are
not directly serving to motivate authors to write individual articles; rather, they serve
to motivate publishers to produce journals, which provide the conventional and often
exclusive means for disseminating these individual articles.
IaL
146 Note that I do not include authors of academic books in this thesis. Financial gain is
often a motivation, sometime a significant one, for authors and publishers of academic books.
Thus, one might expect that the financial return secured by copyright protection might generate
more creativity and publication in this area. Thus, if copyright truly is limited to providing
necessary incentives to create, there is greater justification for extending copyright protection
to authors of academic books than to authors of academic articles.
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academy is the quintessential example of a class of authors whose incen-
tives to create are market transcendent. 147 Because academics do not
rely on the economic aspects of copyright protection to create, academics
will produce scholarship without regard to the availability of copyright
protection. 148 Thus, some commentators might argue pursuant to incen-
tive rationale, that the justification for copyright protection in this con-
text is slim, if not absent.' 49
Moreover, academics would likely find that monopoly rights in aca-
demic expression actually inhibit incentives to create academic expres-
sion. If academic expression enjoys full copyright protection in the
context of academic use, the publishers of that expression will be able to
extract monopoly rent from the primary audience of academic expres-
147 Retention, promotion and tenure, as well as acknowledgment in ones field, are the but
a few of the market-transcendent incentives that induce an academic to produce academic
journal articles. However, many returns on publication are nonmonetary. See Howard P.
Tuckman and Jack Leahey, What is an Article Worth?, 83 J. POL. EcON. 951, 952 (1975)
("Ideally, publications enable faculty to share insights, demonstrate creative scholarship, gain
recognition for creative thinking, and develop a reputation for expertise in a specialty area.").
In attempting to calculate the monetary value of an article with respect to returns on publica-
tion to a scholar, the authors discussed only market-transcendent benefits: direct salary incre-
ments, promotion-related salary increments, and career-related option effects. Id. at 951-55.
148 See Netanel, supra note 22, at 292-93 ("In a world without copyright, only authors
unconcerned with monetary remuneration would produce creative expression and only pub-
lishers with no need for financial return would invest in selecting, packaging, marketing, and
making such expression available to the public.").
149 See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 24, at 488 n.10 (Authors who "work to satisfy their
nonpecuniary desires, the availability of such a nonpecuniary return on authorship suggests
that we could reduce the pecuniary return on authorship, and hence the scope of copyright
protection, proportionally, and yet still ensure the optimal production of copyrighted works.");
John S. Wiley, Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. Cm. L. RPv. 119, 152-54 (1991);
Timothy J. Brennan, Copyright, Property, and the Right to Deny, 68 Cm.-KmNT L. Rnv. 675,
679 (1993):
From an economic viewpoint, the exclusive control entailed by copyright is justified
to the extent that one views copyright as protecting the economic incentive to market
intellectual property according to the creator's intent. This rationale applies less
will, if at all, to uses that do not compete with those uses for which the creator
intended to derive compensation. Hence, these uses lie outside the context of the
classic copyright policy trade-off in which copyright grants a putative monopoly so
to give a creator an incentive to create .... Consequently, one might argue that copy-
right protection ought not be granted to these noncompeting uses and that copyright
holders have no right to suppress in those settings.
Professor Brennan has also stated:
The 'uneasy case' for copyright is that such control is permissible only to the extent
that it provides an incentive to spend one's time, energy, and money to produce
copyable work of value. This ex ante perspective implies that the effect of the bar-
gain on the potential creator extends only as far as reasonably foreseeable gains.
Consequently, it might be argued, we ought not extend copyright beyond the uses
from which the creator intended to earn rewards, as perceived at the time the creator
made her commitments to devote effort and resources to creating.
Id. at 702-03.
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sion-academic consumers.150 Such an expansion of copyright will im-
pose an ever more burdensome access tax on academic consumers and,
thus, the academic expression will be less available and more costly to
these consumers.
Original works of academic expression are published in an eco-
nomic context that renders the original work relatively inaccessible to
many users at one time. Access to such original works is limited to those
users who are able to obtain one of only a few copies purchased by a
library. A scholar who wishes to access the academic expression through
a copy made by photocopy or computer technology may have to pay an
extra tax for each copy. To the extent that copyright protection in a
scholar's potential source and reference material requires payment for
each copy of that source material, some scholarship will never be used
and, in fact, less scholarship may be created.
Given that copyright protection is largely irrelevant as an incentive
for the creation of academic expression and may actually inhibit such
creation, extending restrictions to academic use of academic expression
in the university setting would be inconsistent with the incentive justifi-
cation for copyright. However, the Texaco court belied the fair use doc-
trine's rhetorical allegiance to the incentive justification for copyright,
and indicated that copyright doctrine condones monopoly in a situation
where market incentives are unnecessary to encourage creation of aca-
demic expression. Imposing such copyright restrictions on the academy
cannot be justified through incentive theory. Rather, it can only be at-
tributed to a neoclassical economic justification for copyright-using
copyright doctrine to create the broad proprietary rights that enable a
market mechanism to determine the value of particular academic
expression.
III. IS ACADEMIC USE OF ACADEMIC
EXPRESSION DIFFERENT?
Should the broad property rights in knowledge resulting from neo-
classical economic theory prevail in the university context, or can an
150 The size of this potential monopoly surcharge will be a function of the extent to which
other works might substitute for the work in question and the extent to which the copyright
owner can engage in price discrimination. See Lunney, supra note 24, at 520-21; Sterk, supra
note 7, at 1205. This tax will be especially burdensome to academic users because the percent-
age of the total retail cost that is attributable to copyright protection is huge. Academic con-
sumers will be paying not only for the original work (the journal publication), but will be
paying monopoly rent for a use (photocopy) that copyright owners (publishers) do not have to
contribute any cost to. Academic consumers supply their own search material, paper and labor
in making copies of articles. "The costs of publication are usually incurred during the period
when an article is conceptualized, researched, and polished." Tuckman and Leahey, supra
note 148, at 952.
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argument be made that fair use should have special vitality in this arena?
In other words, in determining the appropriate scope of copyright, can
and should we distinguish the academic use of academic expression from
general uses of other creative works? The answer to whether copyright
restrictions should apply with full force in a university setting inevitably
turns both on how society views the purpose of copyright and on how
society conceives the purpose of the university. I have already discussed
the differing interpretations of the justification for copyright. I now turn
to a discussion of the history and of the differing viewpoints regarding
the proper mission of the university.
A. THE MISSION OF Ti= UNVERsrrY.
Over the last two centuries, the idea of the American university has
changed in accordance with a change in how we view truth. Until the
middle of the nineteenth century, an orthodox understanding of truth in-
fused higher education in America. 151 Although colleges existed to be-
stow knowledge, the test of knowledge was whether it conformed to the
revealed truths of religious doctrines and traditions. 152 Thus, the ad-
vancement of knowledge was restricted to testing the work of teachers
and scholars against the truths of religion. 153
Consequently, prior to the Civil War, most American institutions of
higher education were denominational colleges concerned with inculcat-
ing dogmatic religious truths rather than with searching for new truths.' 54
Because the key role of the university was as a center of orthodoxy
designed to impose particular views on other members of society, these
were institutions of great intellectual conformity. 155 The general accept-
ance of a core of religious doctrine very much restricted any notion of
free inquiry in this setting. Thus, the perceived role of the university did
not require or allow for the intellectual freedom of members of the uni-
versity community.
Following the Civil War, an "educational revolution"' 156 resulted in
a commitment to the critical inquiry central to the modem justification
for the American university. 157 A growing body of American educators
151 See Michael W. McConnell, Academic Freedom in Religious Colleges and Universi-
ties, 53 LAW & CoNTrae. PROBs. 303, 307 (1990).
152 See id. at 306-07.
153 Id.
154 See David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of "Individual" and "Institutional" Ac-
ademic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 227, 237 (1990).
155 See Reports, On Periodic Evaluation of Tenured Faculty, A Discussion at Wing-
spread: August 24-26, 1983, 69 AcADEME la, 5a (Nov.-Dec. 1983).
156 Richard Motstadter & Walter P. Metzger, Preface to WALTER P. ME=zGER, AcAIEuvIC
FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE UNIVEsrrY i, v (1961).
157 See Rabban, supra note 155, at 237.
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became attracted by the questioning spirit of the nineteenth century Ger-
man university.158 The modem American university was born in a con-
scious attempt to free scholarly investigation from the strictures of the
conservative understanding of the advancement of knowledge. Under
this modem view, colleges and universities existed to advance the fron-
tiers of knowledge rather than merely bestow existing knowledge. 159
The test of knowledge became its ability to withstand critical inquiry-
the rigors of debate and disputation. 160 Quite suddenly, the university
was designated the guardian of critical inquiry. It is this scientific search
for truth without prejudice that was adopted as the essential method of
acquiring and advancing new knowledge and understanding.
1. Advancing Value-free Knowledge.
Under this secular philosophy of the university, something intrinsic
to the nature of knowledge and understanding itself served as the justifi-
cation for the university. 61 The underlying theory was the notion that
"new knowledge was valuable for its own sake, irrespective of its contri-
bution to everyday life."' 62 Thus, the original mission of the modem
university was deeply grounded in the production of new knowledge,
whatever its potential application might be:
The modem university required a scholar to be committed to the
creation of objective, "value-free" knowledge. 163 This "value-free" phi-
losophy of the advancement of knowledge animated the requirement that
a university's faculty continuously produce new knowledge and publish
the results.1 64 Thus, the definitive mission of the American university
became the production and publication of new knowledge. 165 This publi-
cation requirement prompted the creation of a number of academic jour-
nals to publish the research and scholarship coming out of the American
universities. Consequently, most American academic journals trace their
158 See Audain, supra note 3, at 1062; William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and
the First Amendment in the Supreme Court of the United States: An Unhurried Historical
Review, 53 LAW AND CoNrann. PROBS. 79, 87 (1990); Matthew W. Finken, On "Institutional"
Academic Freedom, 61 TEx. L. R-v. 817, 822 (1983).
159 See McConnell, supra note 152, at 306-07.
160 See id.
161 See Audain, supra note 3, at 1063; John S. Brubacher, ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF HIGHER
EDUCATION, 12-13 (1982).
162 Audain, supra note 3, at 1062.
163 See id. at 1063
164 See id. at 1062.
165 While Harvard College was the first American institution of higher education, Johns
Hopkins is recognized as the first American university because Johns Hopkins was the first to
espouse the "German Model" of higher education. See id. at 1062 (citing PAUL Wns-
TER~mxuf, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 8-10, 90 (1985); MICHAEL D. STE-
PHENs & GORDON W. RODERICK, POST-SCHOOL EDUCATION 190-91 (1984)).
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origins to the publication requirement implemented at the modem uni-
versities adopting the "value-free" philosophy of knowledge.' 66
2. Advancing Valuable Knowledge.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, another perception of the
mission of the university surfaced in conjunction with the development
of the public universities. State governments began to exercise control
over academic decisions in public universities by requiring those institu-
tions to educate large numbers of students and by pressuring the institu-
tions to lend their services and expertise to stimulating economic
development. Eventually, even private universities were increasingly
viewed as public resources and called upon to contribute to the solution
of social problems.' 67 While the emphasis remained on the advancement
of knowledge, the purpose of the university was not so much on creating
knowledge for its own sake, but on the uses to which knowledge could
be put-on creating knowledge that had "value". This philosophy posits
that knowledge is necessary to understand and solve problems.' 68 Unless
the knowledge has some demonstrable pay-off, it is not worthy of pur-
suit.' 69 Thus, whereas the intrinsic philosophy is animated by the notion
of value-free knowledge, the instrumental philosophy values knowledge
only if it can be directed toward some useful end.170
166 See Audain, supra note 3, at 1062 (citing WESTERNMYER, supra note 166, at 96). In
fact, the AALS Executive Committee appointed a committee to produce a model author-jour-
nal agreement that would serve as a template against which law professors could judge the
agreements they received from law journals. One of the concerns the committee determined it
should address was that the material be made widely available as the "overall function of
student-edited law journals is to provide education for both the student editors and the readers.
The law schools that house and commonly subsidize such journals have the purpose of uncov-
ering and disseminating knowledge." Marci A. Hamilton, Why a Model Author/Journal
Agreement?, Attachment to AALS Memorandum 98-24 at 4 (May 18, 1998) (visited Feb. 4,
1999) <http://www.aals.org/98-24.html>. The draft agreement suggests that authors require
that "the issue of the Journal in which the Work appears shall include a notice stating that the
Work may be reproduced and distributed, in whole or in part, by nonprofit institutions for
education purposes including distribution to students, provided that the copies are distributed
at or below cost." AALS Special Committee, Model Author/Journal Agreement, Attachment
to AALS Memorandum 98-24 at 3 (May 18, 1998) (visited Feb. 4, 1999) <http:llwww.aals.
org/98-24.htuml>.
167 See generally Walter P. Metzger, Academic Freedom in Delocalized Academic Institu-
tions, in DNIESIONS OF AcADE IC FREEDOM 1 (1969) (arguing that the American conception
of academic freedom, with its emphasis on protecting faculty members within the university,
has become outmoded in light of increasing power exercised by decision makers outside
universities).
168 See Audain, supra note 3, at 1063-64.
169 See Co NEL M. HAMM, Pnm.osOPnCAL IssuEs iN EDUXCATION, 52-53 (1989).
170 See Audain, supra note 3, at 1064. Among the arguments opponents of the intrinsic
philosophy put forth is the argument that "it is a delusion to think of knowledge as being
value-free since knowledge is the currency of power today and as such, value-laden." Il. at
1066.
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B. ACADEMIC FREEDOM.
Considering the special purposes of the university, may the acad-
emy claim a special freedom to access copyrighted works of academic
expression? Although some might find little reason to grant academics
more latitude than any other user, the academy has been afforded more
latitude in other areas in recognition of the special purpose of the univer-
sity. This extra latitude is a product of the principles of academic free-
dom, which are viewed as essential to the successful mission of the
university-whether that mission involves advancing value-free or valu-
able knowledge. 171 While the notion of academic freedom has achieved
nearly universal institutional acceptance in this century, the claim that
such freedom is extraordinary continues. The phrase "academic free-
dom" often invokes protests that policies and rules binding on the rest of
society do not apply to the university. 172 Should an academic claim of
copyright exemption be yet another extension of this special freedom?
The term "academic freedom" refers to the "freedom of the individ-
ual scholar to teach and research without interference (except for the re-
quirement of adherence to professional norms, which is judged by fellow
scholars in the discipline)."'173 A comprehensive theory of academic
freedom first emerged in the United States at the time that the modern
university came to dominate American higher education. 174 Once criti-
cal inquiry rather than dogma became the defining characteristic of uni-
versities, the university community required freedom to engage in the
search for knowledge central to the mission of the university. Notions of
academic freedom arose from the need to promote and protect the critical
inquiry viewed as essential to the advancement of knowledge, and thus
essential to the purpose of the university. This new conception of the
171 A 1915 declaration justifies academic freedom in terms of three purposes of universi-
ties: to promote inquiry and advance knowledge, to teach students, and to develop experts for
public service. See AAUP, General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Aca-
demic Tenure (1915), 1 AAUP Bull. 17 (1915), reprinted in, Symposium, Freedom and Ten-
ure in the Academy: The Fifth Anniversary of the 1940 Statement of Principles, 53 LAW &
CoNr=,. PRoBs. 393 app. (1990) [hereinafter 1915 Declaration]. Three distinct faces of
academic freedom have been identified: personal autonomy of individual scholars, limits on
government restrictions on expression within schools, and autonomy of academic institutions.
See generally Mark Yudof, Three Faces of Academic Freedom, 32 Loy. L. Rnv. 831, 834,
848, 851 (1987) (this article primarily is concerned with restrictions on research and
dissemination.).
172 See Rodney A. Smolla, Academic Freedom, Hate Speech, and the Idea of a Univer-
sity, 53 LAW & CoNrra,. PRoBs. 195, 216 (1990).
173 McConnell, supra note 152, at 305. Academic freedom also has an institutional con-
cept-the freedom of the academic institution from outside control. See id at 305. For the
most part, references to "academic freedom" in this article are to individual academic freedom.
174 See Rabban, supra note 155, at 237 (citing Richard Hofstadter & Walter P. Metzger,
Preface to wAr.'aI P. MNrzaa, AcAnmuc FREiDOM IN THE AGE OF THE UNwmVsrrY (Co-
lumbia, 1961)).
1999]
574 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 8:541
advancement of knowledge required that the work of teachers and schol-
ars be free from all constraints other than those of the academic disci-
pline. 175 Academic freedom, as understood in the modem university, "is
predicated on the view that knowledge is advanced only through the un-
fettered exercise of individual human reason in a posture of analytical
skepticism and criticism."'176 This freedom supports the university's
commitment to critical objectivity by "permitting scholars to challenge
received wisdom and insulating them from pressure to adhere to a pre-
scribed orthodoxy."' 177
The first official statement of academic freedom was produced in
1915 by a committee of eminent professors for the first annual meeting
of the American Association of University Professors ("AAUP").178 At
this meeting, the AAUP declared that a university "should be an intellec-
tual experiment station, where new ideas may germinate and where their
fruit, though still distasteful to the community as a whole, may be al-
lowed to ripen until finally, perchance, it may become a part of the ac-
cepted intellectual food of the nation or of the world."' 79 The 1915
Declaration viewed the basic role of professors in this endeavor as shar-
ing the results of their independent and expert scholarly investigations
with students and the general public. 180
This understanding of academic freedom assumed its canonical
form in the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and
Tenure, jointly issued by the AAUP and the Association of American
Colleges ("AAC"). 181 The AAUP's 1940 Statement stated:
"[i]nstitutions of higher education are conducted for the common good
[which] depends upon the free search for truth and its free exposition."'182
The statement defines as one of the three aspects of academic freedom
the "full freedom in research and in the publication of the results."'183
The last several decades have seen increased judicial reliance on
AAUP policy in reaching legal decisions in important cases raising sig-
nificant academic freedom questions. 84 Furthermore, while the 1940
175 See McConnell, supra note 152, at 306-07.
176 Id. at 303-04.
177 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Academic Freedom and Academic Values in Sponsored Re-
search, 66 Tax. L, REv. 1363, 1367 (1988).
178 See 1915 Declaration, supra note 172.
179 Id. at 400.
180 See id at 396.
181 See AAUP, Academic Freedom and Tenure, 72 ACADEME 52, 52-54 app. A (1940
Statement of Principles and Interpretive Comments) (Jan.-Feb. 1986).
182 See Symposium, Freedom and Tenure in the Academy: The Fifth Anniversary of the
1940 Statement of Principles, 53 LAw & CONTEMVP. PROBs. 407 app. B (1940 Statement of
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure) (1990).
183 McConnell, supra note 152, at 307.
184 See Reports, AAUP in the Courts, The Association's Representation of Faculty Mem-
bers and Faculty Causes in Appellate Litigation, 69 AcAD.EME la, 6a (Mar.-Apr. 1983).
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Statement technically has no legal force in its own right, it has been
adopted by most accrediting agencies, whose determinations do have
legal effect. For example, the two agencies that are responsible for the
accreditation of law schools-the American Bar Association ("ABA")
and the Association of American Law Schools ("AALS")-both use the
1940 Statement as their standard for academic freedom.' 85
The United States Supreme Court also has recognized the impor-
tance of academic freedom in the university context, going so far as to
identify academic freedom as a First Amendment right.18 6 In doing so,
the Court has indicated that government encroachment on this right will
have to meet demanding standards. In these cases, the Court, like the
1915 Declaration, has consistently maintained that "the search for truth,
in universities, as well as in society generally, is never complete and
requires free debate about competing ideas that precludes any imposition
of ideological orthodoxy."'187
The Court first recognized academic freedom as a constitutional
right in the 1957 case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire,88 where a plurality
of the court struck down a legislative investigation that delved into the
subject matter of a professor's past lectures. Chief Justice Warren, hav-
ing written the decision reached by four concurring justices stated that
"[tihe essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities
is almost self-evident."' 189 Later, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 90 the
Court held that a New York statute which required faculty members to
certify they had never been members of the Communist Party was inimi-
cal to academic freedom as protected by the First Amendment. 191 The
Keyishian court found academic freedom to be a "special concern of the
First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of ortho-
doxy over the classroom."'192 The Court in subsequent years has gener-
185 See ABA Standard 405(d) that provides, "[tihe law school shall have an established
and announced policy with respect to academic freedom and tenure of which Annex I herein is
an example but is not obligatory." ABA, Standards for Approval of Law Schools, § 405(d)
(1987). Annex I, in turn, follows the text of the 1940 Statement, including the limitations
clause. Id. at Annex I.
Bylaw 6-8(d) of the AALS provides, "A faculty member shall have academic freedom and
tenure in accordance with the principles of the American Association of University Profes-
sors." AALS Association Handbook 24 (1990) (Bylaws of the Association of American Law
Schools, Inc.).
186 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196-97 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
187 Rabban, supra note 155, at 240.
188 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality).
189 Id.
190 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
191 Id. at 603.
192 1l (citations and quotation marks omitted).
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ally afforded great' deference to the academy, recognizing that
universities are places that require the "robust exchange of ideas"' 93 in
order to fulfill their function.
Both the Court and the AAUP have stressed the importance of an
inclusive university community as a means of serving the broader public
interest by furthering democratic values, and both institutions justify aca-
demic freedom as necessary to this goal. The AAUP's 1915 Declaration
stressed the social benefits of scholarly work in universities and empha-
sized that education and knowledge are essential to a civilized and demo-
cratic society.194 Similarly, the Court, in both Sweezy and Keyishian,
emphasized the social importance of critical inquiry to universities in
promoting the knowledge that serves democratic values. Thus, academic
freedom and copyright policy share the same utilitarian goal-contribut-
ing the milieu necessary for a pluralistic and democratic society.
C. INSTITUTIONAL CoNTEXT AS A FAIR USE CONSIDERATION.
Copyright policy and academic freedom theoretically share the goal
of serving democratic values by promoting learning and knowledge.
However, copyright doctrine in the university context implicates aca-
demic freedom because it affects choices made by academics in the pur-
suit of inquiry. In fact, the same educational and scholarly choices made
in the exercise of unfettered critical inquiry might violate copyright re-
strictions. Thus, just as the "justification of academic freedom must
therefore be sought in the peculiar character and function of the univer-
sity scholar,"' 95 the unique academic environment must also define.
Copyright policy in the context of the university should be based on
a justification that recognizes the distinctive mission of the university
and incorporates correlative principles of academic freedom. The ques-
tion then becomes whether a neoclassical economic justification for
copyright is appropriate in the university context when considered in
light of the purposes of the university and the principles of academic
freedom; that is whether copyright serves the mission of the university if
its purpose is to advance academic expression that has the highest market
"value."
IV. IS AN ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION FOR COPYRIGHT
APPROPRIATE IN THE UNIVERSITY CONTEXT?
Initially, the question of whether a neoclassical economic justifica-
tion for copyright furthers the mission of the university may depend on
193 Id.
194 See 1915 Declaration, supra note 172, at 396, 397-99.
195 Glenn R. Morrow, Academic Freedom, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE So-
ctA ScIENcEs 4, 6.(DAviD L. Snus, ed., 1968).
FAIR USE AND ACADEMIC ExPREsSION
which viewpoint we accept regarding the proper mission of the univer-
sity. As discussed above, the intrinsic philosophy of the university seeks
to advance value-free knowledge-the pursuit of knowledge as an end in
itself.196 The instrumental philosophy, on the other hand, seeks to ad-
vance knowledge that has "value." If we assume, pursuant to intrinsic
philosophy, that all knowledge is worth advancing, if only as a challenge
to predominant ideology, a system that purports to identify and advance
only those ideas and knowledge that have "value" is inconsistent with the
mission of the university. If, on the other hand, we adopt the philosophy
that the university's mission is to produce only "valuable" knowledge,
we must ask whether determining value on the basis of market prefer-
ences serves this mission.
Those who advocate a neoclassical economic justification for copy-
right might read Congress's constitutional mandate "to promote the Pro-
gress of Science and the Useful Arts" as containing words of purpose
requiring that only those works that promote the progress of science-
works that have ascertainable value or usefiulness-be encouraged and
disseminated. 97 Thus, they might argue that the neoclassical economic
purpose of copyright dovetails completely with the need to identify valu-
able knowledge in the university context. However, the task of identify-
ing valuable works in any context would involve terribly difficult
questions of judgment regarding the quality and utility of various works,
however. 98 Is neoclassical economic theory an appropriate epistemo-
logical strategy for judging the value of particular academic contribu-
tions to knowledge in the university context?
196 See BRUBACHER, supra note 162, at 12-13 (1982).
197 See also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985)
(monopoly granted by copyright has the intended purpose of "inducing the creation of new
material of potential historical value.") (emphasis added). Compare Mitchell Bros. Film
Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 860 (5' Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917
(1980) (noting that, while Congress could "require that each copyrighted work be shown to
promote the useful arts (as it has with patents), it need not do so.").
198 See Kreiss, supra note 9, at 39. "The copyright system (particularly the courts) is not
particularly well suited to evaluate whether individual works provide a public benefit and,
hence, will not concern itself with such a determination at that microlevel." Id. at 40 (citing
Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087, 1088 (9' Cir. 1973), in which the court rejected a claim that
allegedly fraudulent material should be denied copyright protection:
There is nothing in the Copyright Act to suggest that the courts are to pass upon the
truth or falsity, the soundness or unsoundness, of the views embodied in a copy-
righted work. The gravity and immensity of the problems, theological, philosophi-
cal, economic and scientific, that would confront a court if this view were adopted
are staggering to contemplate. It is surely not a task lightly to be assumed, and we
decline the invitation to assume it.
Id. at 1088.
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Mainstream academic discourse operates from the premise that de-
sirable knowledge is objective. 199 Within this rationallempirical mode of
advancing knowledge, the knowledge produced by the academy must be
a product of certain standards of "impartiality, objectivity, evidential
confirmation, comprehensiveness or completeness, and explanatory
power.' '2°° One of the essential requirements of the university according
to this mode is the obligation to remain neutral-to place itself "on
neither side of a disputed claim to truth."'201 Thus, even if knowledge
must have value, a judgment of value in the university context must be
"value-neutral. '202 It is tempting, therefore, to seize on any neutral prin-
ciples or standards available to minimize the opportunity for biased deci-
sion-making within the university.
On the surface, therefore, a neoclassical economic model of deci-
sion-making seems attractive. Because determinations about whether a
particular work does or does not advance knowledge are so subjective,
some would argue that the question of the value of such works may be
best left to the market to address through its "value-neutral" mechanisms
of allocative efficiency. Economic theory purports to inject market-neu-
trality into the discussion about the relative value of a particular creative
work based on the price it can command in the "objective" market. Per-
haps the market is the best way to identify relevant knowledge and thus
ferret out the truth-the new, improved model for truth-seeking in the
university.
However, a close examination of supposedly neutral standards often
reveals bias. Theoretically, neutral market preferences often reflect di-
verse forms of prejudice because such preferences are arguably a social
construction. 20 3 They are likely influenced by criteria derived from the
199 See Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race
Theory, Post-structuralism, and Narrative Space, 1 AsiAN L.J. 1, 39 (1994). Contrast this
position with the post-structuralist view that objectivity is a false premise upon which to pur-
sue knowledge because knowledge enjoys no universal foundations. This anti-foundationalist
theory views knowledge as "perspectival, language-based, culturally constructed." See id at
44 (citing Jane Tompkins, Me and My Shadow, in GENDER AND TBmoRy: DIALOGUns ON FENu-
NisT CamrcisM 125 (Linda Kauffman ed., 1989).
200 ALiSON M. JAGGAR, FmnMST POLMCS AND HUMAN NATURE 354-55 (1983).
201 Judith Jarvis Thomson, Ideology and Faculty Selection, 53 LAw & CoraMP. PROBS.
155, 164 n.9 (1990).
202 The 1915 Declaration describes a scholar's function as the obligation to deal at first
hand, after prolonged and specialized technical training, with the sources of knowledge; and to
import the results of their own and of their fellow-specialists' investigation and reflection, both
to students and the general public, without fear or favor. The proper discharge of this function
requires (among other things) that the university teacher shall be exempt from any pecuniary
motive or inducement to hold, or to express, any conclusion which is not the genuine and
uncolored product of his own study or that of fellow-specialists. 1915 Declaration, supra note
172, at 396.
203 See generally Neff Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement
of Author Automony- A Normative Evaluation, 24 RtrrGnzs L.J. 347, 435-40 (1993).
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heavy ideological baggage of the dominant culture. 204 Thus, adopting a
neoclassical economic justification for copyright in the university context
compromises the critical objectivity of the academy in determining the
value of knowledge. "Indeed, a broad expanded copyright may, in effect,
stifle transformative uses in a way that parallels, but is far more system-
atic than the problem of private censorship. ' 20 5 Such is the case when
we examine whether market value can really act as a proxy for merit
when making value judgments of academic expression.
Value is already a loaded word in academia these days, even with-
out the pressures of market influences. Strong disagreements currently
exist in the academy as to the legitimacy of particular approaches to aca-
demic disciplines. 2°6 Theoretically, the individual scholar enjoys aca-
demic freedom to teach and research without interference, subject only to
the requirement of adherence to professional norms judged by fellow
scholars in their discipline. However, disciplinary norms themselves are
now contested, as the current polemic regarding the relevance of many
developing academic disciplines indicates.
Recent disputes over the value of scholarship emanating from the
perspectives of racial minorities, feminism and radical legal theory have
highlighted the subjectivity of these disciplinary norms. Some complain,
for example, that certain disciplines have inappropriately modified their
content and their standards to avoid charges of elitism, racism and sex-
ism. 20 7 Such critics claim that in the humanities, established literary
204 See id.
205 Netanel, supra note 24, at 295-96.
206 Consider the dispute over whether critical legal studies should be considered a legiti-
mate mode of discourse in academic law. The AAUP felt compelled to issue two brief state-
ments: one dealing with peer review and the second addressing the controversy over the
"value" of "critical legal studies" in law schools inspired by Paul D. Carrington's essay, Of
Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDuc. 222 (1984), which contained the statement that "the
nihilist who must profess that legal principle does not matter has an ethical duty to depart the
law school." Id. at 227. AAUP, Report of Committee A, 1985-86, AcADEME 13a, 19a (Sept.-
Oct. 1986); AAUP, Some Observations on Ideology, Competence, and Faculty Selection, 72
ACADEmE la (Jan.-Feb. 1986). Correspondence provoked by Carrington's article is collected
in "Of Law and the River," and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1
(1985). More recently, Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry issued an indictment of radical legal
theory in their book, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMRcIAN
LAW (1997).
207 See Doris Y.Wilkinson, The American University and the Rhetoric of Neoconservat-
ism, 20 CoTr-rap. Soc. 550 (1991) (reviewing ROGER KuABALL, TENURED RADIcALs: How
PoLmcs HAS CORRUPTED OUR HIGHER EDUCATION (1990); CHARLES J. SYKES, PRoFSCAM:
PROFESSORS AND THE DEMISE OF HIGHER EDUcATION (1988). According to Wilkinson, Bloom
blames "the more vulnerable disciplines, those where change is most apparent, such as the
humanities and the social sciences as damaging to the integrity of the university." Wilkinson,
supra note 208 at 551. According to Wilkinson, Bloom dismisses the unique experiences,
insights, and intellectual paradigms of white women and the racially ethnically disempowered
and, instead, decries as a crime the institutionalization of what he perceives to be "'the
proliferation of esoteric and irrelevant subjects and idiosyncratic presentations delivered at
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standards are ignored as' various interest groups demand more women's
literature for feminists, black literature for blacks, gay literature for
homosexuals, and so on.20 8 Conversely, others charge that disciplinary
norms are "mere screens for the dominant ideology"20 9 and that institu-
tions of higher education have become "homes of orthodoxy, reaction
and conventionality." 210 Such critics argue that universities are "domi-
nated by male-inspired conceptions of what constitutes good scholarly
work. x211 Still others assert that "the philosophical canon these institu-
tions place before their students is improperly restricted to the products
of Western philosophy, totally ignoring the East. '212 A value system
based on neoclassical economic analysis will only exacerbate these
conflicts.
Once profit considerations are injected into the university context,
the interests of academic authors and publishers diverge. Such consider-
ations may lead academic publishers to choose works on the basis of
profit-maximization. Publication choices may become business deci-
sions based on whether the original work has further "merchandising
value"--a function of which types of academic expression will appeal to
the largest audience. Thus, publishers seeking the widest consumer base
may favor projects that conform to prevailing views of the academic
community and disfavor more unorthodox projects that challenge re-
ceived wisdom.
Such publication decisions may then distort the substantive direc-
tions of research and scholarship by channeling the academy toward
work that is commercially valuable, and thus more desirable, to the pub-
lishers. This can result in repression of participation through reluctance
to promote a viewpoint challenging the status quo. Scholars may feel
compelled to formulate academic expression with broad appeal that satis-
fies the market's collective desires rather than developing scholarly
agendas on the basis of academic interest and intellectual significance.
conferences and professional meetings.' He condemns these as being theoretically impotent
and empty value-laden iniursions on 'the canon."' Id. She characterizes one of Kimball's
primary obsessions as the modification of traditional curriculum to include works by women,
minorities, and persons of color writing, "[h]e depicts contemporary innovations in the human-
ities, as in the social sciences, as 'ideologically motivated assaults on the intellectual and moral
substance of our culture"' Id.; see also Thomson, supra note 202, at 155-56 (some complain
that "left-wing politics and commitments now dominate college and university faculties, and
that institutions of higher education are behaving like homes of left-wing orthodoxy, so that
conservatism cannot get a hearing on campus."); see also Ralph S. Brown and Jordan E. Kur-
land, Academic Tenure and Academic Freedom, 53 LAW & CoNTrMP. PROBS. 325,330 (1990).
208 See iL at 550-51.
209 McConnell, supra note 152, at 314-15.
210 Thomson, supra note 202, at 155-56.
211 Id.
212 Id.
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Thus, a copyright policy that determines value on the basis of profit-
ability cannot provide an unbiased standard from which to value scholar-
ship involving black dialects, feminist literary theory, radical legal
theory, or Marxist economic analysis. When you have dominant and
subordinate ideologies competing in a "scholarship" market, the circular
reinforcement of that market will favor the dominant ideology. Because
adherents of a dominant ideology form a broader base from which to
signal market value, these adherents ultimately have the power to decide
which knowledge is currently worthy as well as the power to create the
paradigms within with these judgments will be made in the future. Fur-
thermore, some consumers' market choices,213 and thus their voices in
determining the relevance of particular scholarship, may be more con-
strained than others as a result of financial disparities.214 Thus, such a
system could enable a class of scholars from wealthier institutions to
unwittingly attain and maintain the ascendancy of its own ideology.
213 Mainline economists emphasize the role of choice in the economic market model.
Value is determined "objectively" by the collective choices made by consumers. Critics of the
market model have introduced a more realistic and less benign view of choice and of the
process of choosing, however. They emphasize the institutional constraints on choice, the
social customs, styles, and conventions that guide choices and the social sanctions that are apt
to be visited on those who make unconventional choices.
214 This concern also raises serious questions about the potential distributional impacts of
such a system. See Netanel, supra note 22, at 295. The economic model ignores the negative
consequences of a system that will likely lead to information inequities by disproportionately
reducing access to information of those consumers with more limited financial resources. See
Netanel, supra note 22, at 295 n.40; see Ni Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Hearings on
H.R. 2441 Before the Subcomm. On Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. On
the Judiciary, 104 1 Congress (1996) (statement of American Association of Law Libraries, etc.
expressing concern that copyright owner ability to impose universal charges "will take us a
very long way towards becoming a nation of information haves and information have-nots.");
Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law
in Cyberspace, 14 CARozo ARTS & ENr. L.J. 215, 264-67 (1996) maintaining that digital
distribution and discontinuation of libraries' provision of free access to information may exac-
erbate socioeconomic inequality); Diane Zimmerman, Copyright in Cyberspace: Don't Throw
Out the Public Interest with the Bath Water, 1994 ANN. Strv. Am. L. 403, 410 (discussing
possible chilling effect on students, scholars and library users of having to pay for each use).
Critics of neoclassical economic analysis strongly object to the application of market theory on
the grounds that it fails to take into account the distributional effects of such a model. The
economic justification for property leaves aside the question of how property rights should be
distributed among the members of society. See Brennan, supra note 161, at 694. This is
because economists generally see matters of distribution as having no appreciable effect on
allocative efficiency. See Netanel, supra note 22, at 293; Fisher, supra note 25, at 1702. But
who gets to charge, and who has to pay, is very much determined by the structure of property
rights. Such a premise reposes ownership of knowledge with the wealthy and powerful. We
may want to assign property rights to ensure that criteria of distributive justice are met or that
wealth inequality is minimized. "Distributive justice combines philosophy, economics, and
jurisprudence in an attempt to establish the fundamental theory by which wealth and resources
are allocated among the members of a society." John J. Flynn and Piero Ruffinengo, Distribu-
tive Justice: Some Institutional Implications of Rawls' A Tnaov OF JUsTICE, 1975 UTAH L.
REv. 1, 123.
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For example, some may argue that the objectivity of the market in
the academic context may actually mask white male subjectivity. The
mainstream legal academy, which is predominantly white and male, al-
ready stands accused of largely ignoring the work of feminist and critical
race scholars.2 15 Importing neoclassical economic principles into deci-
sions regarding the value of scholarship may further suppress knowledge
that is disquieting, disillusioning or unpopular. Ultimately, deriving rele-
vance from market decision-making can inhibit the interplay of ideas and
participation in the enterprise of those with other viewpoints by casting
doubt on the legitimacy of those who are unable or unwilling to assimi-
late their views with the orthodoxy. Such distortion already occurs with-
out the aid of market decision-making. As Paul Carrington has noted:
Much academic expression disappears into the ether
without a trace of recognition, much less response. This,
alas, is what we often mean when we characterize an
expression as "academic," namely, that it does not mat-
ter to anyone but the author. Some of what we say may
be so inconsequential or redundant that it deserves no
recognition or response, but all scholars of experience
know that the relationship between recognition and
worth is loose. Scholarship has its fashions, perhaps
more truly in some disciplines than in others, and those
who buck trends run the greatest risk of seeing their ex-
pressions disappear without a trace.216
An "objective" market can further suppress outsider perspectives in
the university with the result that ideas of which the mainstream disap-
proves, stand little chance of being developed.
As a net result, copyright doctrine based on market theory could
reinforce those tendencies and pressures to conform that are already part
of the university and the larger community in which it exists. One of the
most dangerous threats to academic freedom comes from internal pres-
sures for intellectual conformity.217 Too many academics already find
little merit in disciplinary approaches that differ from their own.21 8 A
neoclassical economic approach to copyright in the university context
215 See Chang, supra note 200, at 5. Richard Delgado has discussed the fact that the more
radical feminist writers, such as Katherine MacKinnon or Susan Brownmill, seem to be cited
less often that more mainstream feminist authors such as Kay, Weitzman, and Ginsberg be-
cause the more radical feminists proposed far-reaching changes in the ways in which society is
constituted. Richard Delgado, Commentary, The Imperial Scholar. Reflections on a Review of
Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PEN. L. REv. 561, 576 n.71 (1984).
216 Paul D. Carrington, Freedom and Community in the Academy, 66 T.x. L. REv.1577,
1579 (1988).
217 See Kingston Brewster, Jr., On Tenure, 58 AAUP BuLL. 381, 382 (1972).
218 See Rabban, supra note 155, at 291.
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might further reinforce the self-perpetuation of like-minded colleagues
and their continued dominance in the generation of ideas through market
pressures for intellectual conformity. Such an effect would directly con-
tradict the 1915 Declaration, which states that the university makes a
social contribution by checking both the hasty impulses of popular opin-
ion and the tendency toward conformity in modem democracies.2 19
Some commentators have already discerned patterns of dominance
and subordination in the context of the impact scholarship, even without
the influence of market principles. 220 These patterns, which would only
be reinforced and exacerbated through market considerations, have wider
social and structural dimensions that just an individual scholar's recogni-
tion. These patterns can actually undermine democratic values. For ex-
ample, commentators recognize that law schools are socially significant
institutions221 and that legal scholarship has been a component of impor-
tant intellectual movements. 222 As Richard Delgado has noted, the po-
tential bias of mainstream scholarship
is not harmless. Courts do cite law review articles; judges, even
when they do not rely on an article expressly, may still read and be in-
formed by it. What courts do clearly matters in our society. Moreover,
what law professors say in their elegant articles contributes to a legal
climate, a culture. Their ideas are read and discussed by legislators,
political scientists, and their own students. They affect what goes on in
courts, law classrooms, and legislative chambers.22 3
A system that encourages an eclectic scholarly output serves demo-
cratic values by addressing diverse political, social and economic inter-
ests. A valuing system that reinforces a dominant culture's ability to
monopolize determinations regarding which knowledge is worthy of ad-
vancing places those outside that culture at a political disadvantage.
219 See 1915 Declaration, supra note 172, at 400.
220 Richard Delgado has already noted "the absence of minority scholarship from the text
and footnotes of leading law review articles about civil rights." Delgado, supra note 216, at
565. In a 1984 article, he discussed his impression that certain scholarship written by minority
professors teaching at American law schools "seems to have been consigned to oblivion.
Courts rarely cite it, and the legal scholars whose work really counts almost never do. The
important work is published in eight or ten law reviews and is written by a small group of
professors, who teach in the major law schools." Id at 562-63.
221 See Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal
Academia, 1990 DuKE L.J. 705.
222 See Mark Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J 1205
(1981).
223 Delgado, supra note 216, at 562-63; see also Derrick Bell, Bakke, Minority Admis-
sions and the Usual Price for Racial Remedies, 67 CAL. L. REv. 3, 4 n.2 (1979) (listing
minority scholarship overlooked by the Supreme Court in Regents of Univ. of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265). Bell points out that Bakke cites 10 law review articles by white male
authors at Bakke, 438 U.S. at 288 n.25. Bell, supra note 224, at 4 n.2.
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Given the ramifications of a neoclassical economic justification for
copyright in the university context on the mission of the university in
particular and society in general, we should not base decisions regarding
the value of academic expression on neoclassical economic principles.
Such principles cannot supply the inclusive critical inquiry contemplated
by the mission of the university in determining what type of scholarship
and research is worthy of pursuit. A doctrine that contributes to the es-
tablishment of "orthodoxy," and thereby detracts from the inclusive prin-
ciples, upon which the university is premised contrasts starkly with the
modem notion of the advancement of knowledge. The possibility of
market-driven censorship resulting from such a doctrine compromises
those academic values traditionally protected by academic freedom.
The core of academic freedom is the freedom of scholars to assess
existing theories, established institutions, and widely held beliefs accord-
ing to the canons of truth adopted by their academic disciplines, without
fear of sanction by anyone if they arrive at unpopular conclusions. Aca-
demic freedom allows scholars to follow their autonomous judgment
wherever it leads them, provided that they remain within the bounds of
scholarly standards of inquiry.224
Thus, basing value judgments regarding scholarship on neoclassical
economic principles would undermine the mission, and ultimately the
credibility, of the university as a truth-seeking institution.225
224 See Amy Gut mAI , D mocRATIc EDUCATION 175 (Princeton University Press 1987).
See also Van Alstyne, supra note 159, at 87 ("A faculty, especially a research faculty, is
employed professionally to test and propose revisions in the prevailing wisdom .... It's func-
tion is primarily one of critical review: to check conventional truth, to reexamine ('re-search')
what may currently be thought sound but may be more or less unsound.").
225 The 1915 Declaration states that:
it is the first essential that the scholars who carry on the work of universities shall
not be in a position of dependence upon the favor of any social class or group, that
the disinterestedness and impartiality of their inquiries and their conclusions shall be,
so far as is humanly possible, beyond the reach of suspicion.
1915 Declaration, supra note 172, at 399. Application of neoclassical economic analysis to
determine the value of scholarship and research echoes concerns about the danger of university
and external attempts to coerce faculty research into areas likely to attract corporate and gov-
ernment funding. See Stuart W. Leslie, From Backwater to Powerhouse, STA wORD (Mar.
1990) at 55 (Stanford University achieved preeminence in electrical engineering by attracting
financial support and faculty from military contractors and by directing its research program
and curriculum to military priorities); Eliot Marshall, Harvard Tiptoes into the Market, 241
SCIENCE 1595 (1988) (citing faculty criticism of proposed university funding for commercial
development of professor's efficient method of making bacteria express human genes; concern
that such projects would divert faculty from pure scholarship prompted new program to assure
all funded projects are of "highest intellectual quality."); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Academic
Freedom and Academic Values in Sponsored Research, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 1363 (1988); AAUP,
Academic Freedom and Tenure: Corporate Funding of Academic Research, 69 ACADEME la,
18a (Nov.-Dec. 1983); AAUP, Government Censorship and Academic Freedom, 69 ACADEME
la, 15a (Nov.-Dec. 1983).
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Instead, we must apply principles that serve to include, rather than
exclude, outsider perspectives-principles that can find a scholar's ef-
forts valuable "even if, and sometimes especially when, the external
'marketplace of ideas', in its slavish devotion to fashion, places low
value on them."226 We should judge the value of knowledge only after
engaging in the critical inquiry so essential to the advancement of knowl-
edge and the mission of the university-an inquiry founded on the notion
that there are multiple methods for judging value and that different kinds
of value cannot be reduced one to another. Only through such pluralistic
critical inquiry can we make a determination of value that comports with
the advancement of knowledge contemplated by the Framers
The appropriate testing of knowledge through critical inquiry re-
quires the inclusion of many opposing intellectual perspectives within
the same investigation. Market criteria of judgment ignore these crucial
attributes of the advancement of knowledge. Copyright policy in the uni-
versity context should encourage and allow a scholar to explore every
tributary and rivulet of a disciplinary stream without the distorting inter-
ference of unwarranted market considerations. Judgments based on mar-
ket criteria will diminish the advancement of knowledge through further
isolation. Thus, we should reject institutional mechanisms that produce
such judgments.
V. INCORPORATING ACADEMIC FREEDOM PRINCIPLES
THROUGH AN INCENTIVE JUSTIFICATION
To adequately pursue its role as envisioned by the Court and the
AAUP, the university must operate from the premise of inclusion of va-
ried perspectives. At the same time, the university must eschew intru-
sions that further a policy of exclusion. The American Geophysical
Union, Inc. v. Texaco court's fair use analysis reveals a remarkable lack
of sensitivity to the importance of such an environment to the advance-
ment of knowledge in the university context. The court's almost exclu-
sive focus on the market for academic contributions to knowledge
ignored the institutional context in which such works are produced and
used. As a result, current fair use doctrine appears poised to expand
copyright restrictions in the unique institutional setting of the university
without thought to the ramifications that copyright's restrictions may
have on that setting.
So how can we reconcile copyright with academic freedom? How
do we fashion a copyright policy that meets incentive needs without
compromising the academic freedom that is at the root of scholarship and
research? As discussed above, the university's mission of the advance-
226 Carrington, supra note 217, at 1580.
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ment of knowledge, whether relevant or value-free, is best served by a
policy that furthers critical inquiry rather than one that inordinately curbs
the free flow of information. In essence, the advancement of knowledge
in the university context is a shared project that should be based on a
policy of inclusion rather than exclusion. Principles of academic free-
dom recognize that, for the university to achieve this goal, we must self-
consciously design institutions affecting the university with these goals
in mind. An incentive justification for copyright reflects the same public
interest concerns that underlie the traditional justification for university-
free scientific inquiry through the maximum production and dissemina-
tion of knowledge. Thus, the goals of copyright doctrine, as defined by
incentive theory and the mission of the university, converge in the con-
text of the academic use of academic expression. The same values that
traditionally have justified academic freedom also justify recuperating an
incentive justification for copyright in the university context.
An incentive justification for copyright is premised on the inter-
twined nature of access and creativity that also lies at the heart of ad-
vancing knowledge in the university context. Incentive theory
"contemplates the creation and free flow of information; the unhindered
flow of such information through, among other things, education in turn
spawns the creation and free flow of new information. '227 Thus, such an
inclusive theory of copyright doctrine better serves the mission of the
university by providing scholars with market-transcendent incentives to
create academic expression while, at the same time, maximizing the di-
versity, intellectual quality and social value of that expression.
A. PROMOTING INCLUSION IN THE ACADEMY'S CONTRIBUTION TO
KNOWLEDGE.
Broad access is the engine that drives the production and dissemina-
tion of academic expression in the university and creates the opportunity
for an inclusive scholarly environment. "Dialogue, and the willingness
to engage in it with those of opposing viewpoints, comes to embody
many of the qualities that morally legitimate the scholarly 'calling.' A
willingness to tolerate a seeming cacophony of 'truths' becomes in many
ways the sine qua non of our scholarly endeavor."228 The "academic
enterprise, more than other endeavors, generates and evaluates ideas. '229
Academics are part of a community with a shared goal and should en-
gage in a cooperative process in trying to achieve that goal. "Inhibition
227 Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1394
(6' Cir. 1996) (Chief Judge Martin dissenting).
228 Audain, supra note 3, at 1075-76.
229 Phoebe A. Haddon, Academic Freedom and Governance: A Call for Increased Dia-
logue and Diversity, 66 Tax. L. Rv. 1561,1564-65 (1988).
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of conversation or the exchange of ideas negates the academic commu-
nity's purpose-attaining and transmitting knowledge."2 30 Thus, broad
intellectual collaboration and communication are critical to maintaining
the diverse discourse necessary to academic creativity. Without such
discourse, scholars from different perspectives may become entrenched
in their own ideology, and thus, the advancement of knowledge will
forgo the benefits to be achieved when scholars listen to one another.231
B. PROMOTING CREATIVITY IN THE AcADEMY's CONTM UTION TO
KNOWLEDGE.
Furthermore, because an incentive justification promotes the widest
exchange of academic expression, a copyright policy based on such a
justification will actually stimulate creativity in the academy. In fact,
scholars studying the psychology of creativity have established a nexus
between diverse dialogue and the existence of creativity. 232  Such re-
search indicates that an increase in the exchange of ideas among scholars
is more likely to lead to an increase of creativity.233
Scholars engaging in creativity research agree that two basic ap-
proaches to improving group creativity are brainstorming and brainwrit-
230 M. at 1565.
231 Robert Chang describes a situation in which physicists became locked in a stand-off
about whether light was a wave or a particle. Imprisoned within their own ideologies, wave
theorists could not see that light bears some characteristics of a particle and particle theorists
were blind to the notion that light bears some characteristics of a wave. Thus, these two
groups of physicists delayed the eventual revelation that light might be both a particle and a
wave. Only through extended dialogue were physicists able to recognize a new model to
explain the occurrence of these overlapping characteristics-wave mechanics. See Chang,
supra note 200, at 32 (citing THoMAs S. KuHN, THE STRucruRE OF ScmNrnXc REVOLUTIONS
12-14 (2 nd ed. 1970).
232 See Audain, supra note 3, at 1071.
233 See id. at 1075. Network analysis provides a useful theoretical framework for under-
standing the degree to which there is reciprocity in communication among scholars. In an
ideal world, there would be complete symmetricality between and among scholars. Under
network analysis, two of the best ways to characterize a communication relationship is accord-
ing to its strength (frequency) and its symmetricality. See iL at 1057. A reasonable standard
for judging the strength of communication between scholars is the extent of actual access to
and dissemination of academic expression. In communication theory, a basic theoretical dis-
tinction is made between communication that is unidirectional and communication that is bi-
directional or symmetrical. See id. at 1051. A unidirectional flow of information involves an
outflow of information from a source with no inflow of information back to the source. A
symmetrical flow of information involves a flow of information flowing into and out of a
source. The chief benefits of highly symmetrical communication without restrictions are high
organizational morale, to the extent the morale depends upon communication, flexibility and
potentially high speed and accuracy of information. See id. at 1052. Thus a dialogic structure
of communication among scholars in the form of scholarship benefits from maximum sym-
metricality. The best model of communication to occur among scholars is a symmetrical
model where all scholars are able to communicate with other scholars through their
publications.
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ing.234 Brainstorming refers to the oral generation of ideas within a
group. In academia, such brainstorming might take place through infor-
mal discussion or through formal colloquia. Brainwriting involves ideas
generated through communication by writing.235 In interactive brain-
writing, there is no oral group discussion of ideas. 236 Rather, "individu-
als are encouraged to improve upon their ideas once they have been
exposed to the ideas of the other members of the group. ' 237 Among
scholars, "the formal process of writing articles which are in turn read
and discussed by other legal scholars appears to be a formalized version
of the brainwriting technique of group creativity. '238 Such brainwriting
is useful because new ideas, as well as the critique of submitted ideas,
originate from many different sources.239 A scholar's communication
with peers may yield new insights or research programs not thought pos-
sible, or even imagined.
Thus, communication research shows that broad dialogue in the
academy results in increased creativity. This increased creativity under-
girds the ability of the university to fulfill its mission. Unwarranted
copyright restrictions on academic expression, on the other hand, will
reduce such dialogue and thus impair creativity among scholars. 24 0 An
incentive justification would limit copyright restrictions to only those
necessary to foster academic creativity.
C. PROMOTING DEMOCRATIC VALUEs.
Creation of knowledge is not the only role the university plays in
the advancement of knowledge. The duty and corresponding of aca-
demic freedom the university also includes the freedom to transmit the
fruits of inquiry to the wider community. 24 1 In this role, the university
serves as a political institution by giving voice to, and addressing the
diverse concerns of, society. To an increasing extent, society in general,
and government in particular, have come to rely upon academic scholars
and researchers for acquiring the skills and knowledge that shape society.
234 See id. at 1073 (discussing several creativity-training programs); CARLE M. MooRE,
GROUP TECHNIQUES FOR IDEA BUILDING 9 (1987) (discussing "four techniques that can be
utilized by groups of people to manage complexity; that is, to generate, develop, and select
between ideas.").
235 See Audain, supra note 3, 1074.
236 See id.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id at 1075.
240 See Sterk, supra note 7, at 1210.
241 See Rabban, Does Academic Freedom Limit Faculty Autonomy?, 66 TEx. L.
REv.1405, 1418 (1988) ("Dissemination of the products of scholarly inquiry in order to ad-
vance knowledge is a basic norm of academic freedom.") (hereinafter Rabban, Faculty
Autonomy].
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Unwarranted copyright restrictions abridge the traditional freedom of
scholars to disseminate the products of their endeavor. An incentive jus-
tification for copyright enhances democratic participation by limiting
such copyright restrictions and thus allowing the public broad access to
academic expression.
Shaping a copyright policy particularly sensitive to the purposes and
needs of the academic milieu requires a revival of an incentive justifica-
tion for copyright. With any luck, such a justification will result in the
recognition of a special academic status in fair use cases that reflects an
emerging judicial sensitivity to the realities of the academic endeavor.
However, if the courts are unwilling to incorporate academic freedom
principles in fashioning an appropriate copyright policy for the university
context, Congress should take the initiative by carving out a specific ex-
emption for academic use of academic expression as it has done in the
past for other specific uses when it has determined special attention was
warranted.242 Congress could easily justify such an exemption on the
basis of incentive rationale after recognizing that the creation of aca-
demic expression in the university context does not depend on, and in
fact may be diminished by, market considerations.
242 For example, fair use claims have arisen in situations where scholars or biographers
have wished to make use of private letters, diaries, or journals residing in library collections.
Two decisions by the Second Circuit created great controversy by suggesting that the unpub-
lished nature of the works might preclude a finding of fair use. See New Era Publications Int'l
v. Henry Holt & Cl., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990); see
Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987). Scholars and publishers reacted
strongly to these decisions and in 1992 Congress amended section 107 to reaffirm that the
unpublished nature of a copyrighted work is not a bar to a finding of fair use. The amendment
reads, "The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors." 17 U.S.C. §107 (1999).
Additionally, sections 108-120 of the Copyright Act identify activities that are non-infringing
notwithstanding the provisions of section 106. For example, the first-sale doctrine embodied
in section 109(a) of the Copyright Act permits the purchaser of a lawfully obtained copy-
righted book to resell or lend that copy without infringing the copyright. This exception
avoids the administrative nightmare that would result if every reseller or lender of a book were
required to obtain copyright clearance. Through these sections, Congress has also prohibited
copyright owners from bringing infringement action for noncommercial consumer recordings
of music and the public display of a lawfully made copy of a work by the copy's owner. 17
U.S.C. §§ 113-114 (1999).
Congress has already created a clear safe harbor for classroom copying. The Agreement on
Classroom Guidelines sets the minimum standards for educational fair use under section 107.
See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94' Cong., 2d Sess. 66, 66-68 (1976). Congress did not intend the
guidelines:
to limit the types of copyright permitted under the standards of fair use under judicial
decision and which are stated in Section 107 .... There may be instances in which
copying which does not fall within the guidelines stated below may nonetheless be
permitted under the criteria of fair use.
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CONCLUSION
Copyright creates property rights in expression where they would
otherwise not have existed. This special grant "places the policy burden
on the advocate for copyright"243 in each particular situation. Advocates
of the neoclassical economic justification cannot satisfy this burden in
the university context because the neoclassical economic justification for
copyright is inconsistent with the mission of the university. Copyright
restrictions on academic use premised on a neoclassical theory of copy-
right directly impact academic values favoring critical inquiry, objectiv-
ity, access and dissemination. Such restrictions undermine the free
exchange and criticism of ideas that lie at the core of academic freedom
and upon which its public benefit depends.244 Thus, they disempower
the academy in its ability to judge knowledge on the basis of academic
principles by replacing scholarly judgment with market judgment. Ulti-
mately, such restrictions could undercut public confidence in the inde-
pendence of scholarly judgments. 245 These implications argue for a
heightened attention to the effects of copyright doctrine in the university
context. Congress and the courts should therefore fashion copyright pol-
icy in the university context pursuant to an insightful and supportive en-
dorsement of the mission of the university and its correlative academic
freedom.
243 Brennan, supra note 150, at 685.
244 See AAUP, Academic Freedom and Tenure: Corporate Funding of Academic Re-
search, 68 AcADEm 18a, 18a-19a (Nov.-Dec. 1983); AAUP, Government Censorship and
Academic Freedom, 68 ACADEME 15a, 16a (Nov.-Dec. 1983); AAUP, Statement on Preventing
Conflicts of Interest in Government-Sponsored Research (1964), reprinted in AcADEaNc FREE-
Dom AND TarquiF 82-84 (L. Joughin ed., 1969).
245 Rabban, Faculty Autonomy, supra note 252, at 1409.
